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INTRODUCTION
The law of adjudicatory jurisdiction, or personal jurisdiction as it is
more commonly called, concerns a court's power to renderjudgments
enforceable in the forum and by other sovereign states. For U.S.
courts, both state and federal, judicial jurisdiction is as essential to
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institutional existence as oxygen is to human beings. Without it,
courts are unable to render binding judgments; without it, they are
paper tigers.
Measuring the breadth of judicial power under modern jurisdic-
tional doctrine is not a formulaic undertaking, to be sure, but most
of the time all that is required is to take into account the acts or omis-
sions of a single defendant in relation to the forum. That is, we fre-
quently need look no further than to see whether the defendant's own
conduct makes her amenable to suit. If I travel to collect a debt from
one who has taken up residency in a distant state and, in the collec-
tion process, inflict physical injury on the debtor, there is little ques-
tion that I must be prepared to defend myself in that forum against
a civil suit, under penalty of default if I do not appear. Even when a
defendant does not personally commit any acts in or directed at
the forum, modern statutes and constitutional doctrine render the ab-
sent actor amenable to suit. Following the procedural revolution of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,' defendants are no longer able
to evade the jurisdictional grasp of a court merely by taking the
expedient step of retreating from the forum before being served or,
for that matter, not setting foot within the state at all but instead act-
ing from a safe distance. Thus, I cannot avoid being subject to suit by
hiring someone else and instructing her to use all means necessary to
collect the debt in the forum state on my behalf. Upon a close ex-
amination of modem jurisdictional doctrine, we may discover two dif-
ferent rationales to explain why the exercise ofjurisdiction would be
upheld.
Jurisdiction may be predicated on the actions I personally took
in hiring someone to find and arrest the debtor in the forum state.
For jurisdictional purposes, my actions have both statutory and consti-
tutional relevance. These were purposeful acts that were directed
2
to cause injury in the forum. I personally retained someone to act
on my behalf and either knew or should have known that if kneecaps
were broken the injury would be felt (painfully) by the debtor in
the forum. The Supreme Court has recognized that in these
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney 2001) ("As to a cause of action arising
from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who [acted] in person
or through an agent ... ").
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circumstances the forum state may exercise jurisdiction without violat-
3ing due process.
In the situation in which one hires someone else to collect a debt,
the first explanation for the exercise of state court power over her is
similar to the rationale that justifies jurisdictional amenability when
she personally travels to the forum: in both instances, jurisdiction is
triggered by her own actions. While we may conceive ofjurisdiction as
based on the personal conduct of the named defendant, a second, al-
ternative rationale may justify the exercise of judicial jurisdiction by
the forum court over a nonresident. Unlike the prior basis, which fo-
cuses exclusively on what one personally did in the forum or on what
actions she personally took outside of the forum that she knew or
should have known would cause injury within the state, it is also possi-
ble to base the exercise of state court power on the attribution of her
agent's forum contacts to her. Under this second formulation, juris-
diction may be understood as triggered not by one's own contacts with
the forum, but by the jurisdictionally sufficient contacts or forum
nexus of another. Of course, to make this jurisdictional leap, a valid
basis is needed for treating another person or entity's jurisdictionally
sufficient contacts as though they were the defendant's. That is, there
must be some substantive legal rule that permits the court to disregard
ajuridical entity's otherwise separate legal existence.
In the example above, agency law may be called upon tojustify the
imputation of contacts. When one, a principal, hires and instructs
another, an agent, to act on her behalf by traveling to the forum to
collect a debt, she creates an agency relationship between them.4
When the agent carries out the job, she is acting within the course and
scope of her agency; that is, she is acting as the principal intended
her to act. If the principal is liable for any injuries the agent causes
in the forum as a matter of substantive law, then it may be argued
3 See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("[lIt is essential in each
case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.").
4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY§ 1 cmt. b (1958) (observing that agency
requires a showing of (1) "the manifestation by the principal that the agent shall act
for him," (2) "the agent's acceptance of the undertaking," and (3) the parties' under-
standing "that the principal is to be in control of the undertaking"); see also RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001) ("Agency is the
fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a 'principal') manifests assent to
another person (an 'agent') that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and sub-
ject to the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so
to act.").
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correspondingly that, as an a priori matter, under modem jurisdic-
tional doctrine the principal is amenable to any suit in the forum state
arising out of those injuries.
There is nothing especially remarkable about this second explana-
tion for why the forum court would be able to exercise jurisdiction
over the principal for having instructed an agent to collect the debt
on her behalf. The attribution of contacts of one person or entity to
another for jurisdictional purposes is a frequently seen and often in-
voked form of traditional jurisdictional argument. Indeed, this ra-
tionale is necessary for engaging in jurisdictional analysis for any case
involving nonnatural entities, such as corporations, which cannot act
except through others. In International Shoe, which rejected the old
"presence" theory of jurisdiction, Justice Harlan Stone noted, in one
of the most important passages of the opinion, that to ask whether the
corporation is present in the forum so as to satisfy due process "is to
beg the question to be decided."' Corporate presence, he observed,
"can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by those
who are authorized to act for it."6 We measure jurisdiction over a cor-
poration by the extent and kind of activities "of the corporation's
agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy
the demands of due process."' Justice Felix Frankfurter made a simi-
lar point three years later in his concurring opinion in United States v.
8
Scophony Corp. of America. In upholding service of process and the ex-
ercise ofjurisdiction over a foreign corporate parent based on in-state
service on its domestic affiliate, he wrote: "What was done in the
Southern District of New York on behalf of [the parent] ... estab-
lishes that the corporation was there transacting business and was
found there in the only sense in which a corporation ever 'transacts
business' or is 'found."' 9
Even though the use of vicarious jurisdiction for nonnatural
entities is a recognized and unremarkable application of jurisdiction,
the incorporation of substantive law into the measure of adjudicatory
jurisdiction can be problematic. ,While reliance on such law may
be useful to identify forum contacts, agency law, and other similar
substantive law doctrines-such as respondeat superior, civil and
criminal conspiracy, and especially, the corporate law doctrine of veil
5 326 U.S. at 316.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 317.
8 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
Id. at 819 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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piercing-it may be misused in a manner that produces jurisdictional
determinations that are neither sound nor necessary. The line
between reasoned analysis and rudderless doctrine is difficult to
identify and easy to cross. Veil piercing and agency theory are the
areas of substantive law most frequently invoked tojustify the exercise
of vicarious jurisdiction. As a result, this Article concentrates on the
intersection of these two doctrines of substantive law with the law of
judicial jurisdiction.10
To better understand how the substantive law of veil piercing is
used to measure judicial jurisdiction, consider a common fact pattern
one encounters in case law. A lawsuit is brought against a company
that is chartered and headquartered outside of the forum state and is
not subject to that forum's jurisdiction based on its own contacts. If
the named defendant is the corporate parent of a wholly owned sub-
sidiary that is amenable to suit in the forum, the plaintiff might bor-
row from the substantive corporate law of veil piercing to assert that
the two corporations should be regarded as one and the same for ju-
risdictional purposes. The veil-piercing doctrine typically provides
that a subsidiary corporation and its otherwise separate owner
(whether a natural person or a corporate affiliate) will be treated as
one if the corporate form has been "misused to accomplish certain
wrongful purposes, most notably fraud, on the shareholder's behalf"'
or where the corporate form has been "used as a mere agency or in-
strumentality of the owning company."" If the two corporations are
treated as one for substantive liability purposes, the plaintiff would ar-
gue that the forum contacts of the subsidiary may be imputed to the
parent so as to bring it within the forum court's reach.
As we shall see, the use of veil-piercing law for jurisdictional pur-
poses occurs frequently in our modern case law, yet its origins may be
traced to a convergence of paths that occurred more than three quar-
ters of a century ago. At issue in Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy
Packing Co.13 was the reach of the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina over a
Maine corporation whose principal place of business was in Illinois.
4
10 For one earlier work that discusses the use of conspiracy law in the jurisdictional
test, see Ann Althouse, The Use of Conspiracy Theory to Establish In PersonamJurisdiction: A
Due Process Analysis, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 234 (1983).
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62 (1998).
12 Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass'n, 247 U.S.
490, 501 (1918).
13 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
14 Id. at 334.
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The plaintiff argued that the activities of its wholly owned affiliate in
North Carolina were sufficient to bring the nonresident parent within
the court's jurisdictional ambit.i The plaintiff maintained that attrib-
uting the presence of the subsidiary to the out-of-state parent was ap-
propriate for jurisdictional purposes because the two corporations, as
a matter of substantive corporate law, should be regarded as one and
the same.16
In many respects, Cannon reads very much like a decision from a
bygone age. At that time, the law regarding the limited liability pro-
tections of the corporate form was inchoate and uncertain. Moreover,
when Cannon was decided the jurisdictional rules were premised on a
theory of state court power long since discredited. Despite the doc-
trinal obsolescence of both its procedural and substantive features,
Justice Louis Brandeis's decision stands as one of the most significant
modern crossroads of substance and procedure. Cannon is the foun-
tainhead from which many modern conceptions of jurisdictional doc-
trine and theory flow. Like a great, old movie that may be dated by
more contemporary cinematic standards, Cannon still stands as a clas-
sic and continues to influence more recent adaptations of the field."
The questions that bedeviled the Court at that time remain just as
relevant and perplexing to us now. How should the substantive law
treat persons who act through the corporate form? To what extent
does limited liability shield owners from suit? Even before reaching
these substantive questions, there was and still is the a priori matter of
determining the reach of state court territorial authority to bind cor-
porations and corporate actors not present in the forum. To be sure,
the modalities of the doctrinal debates regarding both corporate and
jurisdictional law have shifted and evolved over the last seventy-five
years; but the issues that were joined in the Cannon case at the end of
the first quarter of the twentieth century remain challenging at the
start of the next. Indeed, with the focus on corporate accountability
sharply intensifying in recent times, with the debate raging daily over
the broadening of personal responsibility for corporate acts and omis-
sions, and with scandals over some of the country's biggest and most
well-known corporations punctuating the current national dialogue,
15 Id. at 335.
16 Id. at 337-38.
17 See infra Part I1 (reviewing the state ofjurisdictional doctrine as it existed at the
time Cannon was decided).
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these abiding legal questions may be even more pertinent-and vex-
ing-today.
8
From our vantage point three quarters of a century later, it is
hard to overstate the significance of Cannon as the originating
precedent validating the use of veil piercing for jurisdictional
purposes. Consider, as one measure, how often veil piercing is relied
upon for procedural purposes. Dean Phillip Blumberg's masterful
multivolume treatise, The Law of Corporate Groups, devotes an entire
volume in excess of 450 pages (and a supplement of nearly equal
length) to cataloging judicial decisions in which the substantive law
is invoked as the sought-after predicate for a vicarious jurisdictional
determination. His work demonstrates that federal and state report-
ers are littered with jurisdictional veil-piercing cases. Similarly, Robert
Thompson found a substantial number of cases in which veil piercing
was relied upon for jurisdictional purposes. 2° Blumberg's exhaustive
study and Thompson's empirical work confirm, both in absolute
terms and on a percentage basis (as compared with all personal
jurisdiction challenges2'), that the incidence of cases where a vicarious
jurisdictional argument was at issue is significant.22  Every United
18 See generally Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance. 2002 Style, 40
HOUS. L. REv. 1 (2003) (discussing corporate governance issues arising from Novem-
ber 2001 to November 2002, including scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Aldephia, and
Tyco, and passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.S., 15 U.S.C.S., 18 U.S.C.S., 28 U.S.C.S.,
29 U.S.C.S.)).
19 PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL
PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS (1983); PHILLIP 1.
BLUMBERG & KAREN P. WACKERMAN, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL
PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS (Supp. 2002).
20 Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL
L. REv. 1036, 1060 (1991) (documenting 141 cases in which jurisdiction was asserted
on the basis of veil piercing). In his treatise, Blumberg identifies substantially more
cases than were identified in Thompson's empirical study because he focuses on veil
piercing not only as it has been invoked for judicial jurisdiction as a matter of federal
constitutional law, but also for service of process; federal subject matter and diversity
jurisdiction; the general federal venue statute; specific federal venue statutes; resjudi-
cata and collateral estoppel; joinder of parties; injunctions; multiple derivative actions;
standing to sue under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
7 8p (2000); and several other procedural contexts. BLUMBERG, supra note 19.
21 See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL.
L. REv. 1, 24-26 (1998) (identifying 975 reported state supreme court and federal ap-
pellate court decisions over a twenty-five-year period, from January 1, 1970, to Decem-
ber 31, 1994, in which the issue of personal jurisdiction had been raised).
22 See also LEA BRILMAYEPR & JACK GOLDSMITH, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 562-63 (2002) (observing that "there is increasing litigation over the effect
onjurisdictional analysis of corporate ties").
2004] 1029
1030 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYL VANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 152: 1023
23States court of appeals, along with innumerable federal district
courts and state courts,4 has had to consider the validity of
jurisdictional veil-piercing arguments. Moreover, the use of this form
of vicarious jurisdiction pervades not only domestic litigation, but
25international civil litigation in U.S. courts as well.
It is not only the prevalence of these arguments that makes the
subject an important one on which to concentrate. The use of veil
piercing is particularly troubling-and, therefore, particularly compel-
ling to reexamine-because the incorporation of the substantive law
for jurisdictional purposes has been largely accepted as an article of
faith among courts and commentators. Virtually without dissent dur-
ing the better part of this century, the lower courts have approved ju-
risdictional veil-piercing arguments to satisfy the statutory and consti-
tutional requirements for amenability to suit.26  The conventional
academic view has not challenged the use of veil piercing either.
Blumberg, for instance, is critical of what he calls the traditional ac-
count of Cannon and disapproves of the "entity" theory of corporate
23 For examples of courts of appeals addressing jurisdictional veil piercing, see
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 94-99 (2d Cir. 2000); Consolidated Devel-
opment Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1291-95 (11th Cir. 2000); Ranger Enterprises,
Inc. v. Leen & Associates, Inc., Nos. 97-35077, 97-35078, 1998 WL 668380, at *34 (9th
Cir. Sept. 21, 1998); IDS Life Insurance Co. v. SunAmerica Life Insurance Co., 136 F.3d 537,
540-41 (7th Cir. 1998); Dean v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 134 F.3d 1269, 1273-76 (6th Cir.
1998); Genetic Implant Systems, Inc. v. Core-Vent Corp., 123 F.3d 1455, 1458-60 (Fed. Cir.
1997); AT&T Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1996);
Gundle Lining Construction Corp. v. Adams County Asphalt, Inc., 85 F.3d 201, 205-09 (5th
Cir. 1996); Gray v. Riso Kagaku Corp., No. 95-1741, 1996 WL 181488, at *24 (4th Cir.
Apr. 17, 1996); T & N, PLC v. Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, 44 F.3d 174, 181-
83 (3d Cir. 1994); Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 62 (4th Cir. 1993);
H.H. Robertson Co. v. V.S. DiCarlo General Contractors, Inc., 994 F.2d 476, 477 (8th Cir.
1993); Donatelli v. National Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 465 (1st Cir. 1990); Davis v.
Metro Productions, Inc., 885 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1989); I.A.M. NationalPension Fund v.
Wakefield Industries, Inc., 699 F.2d 1254, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Lucas v. Gulf & Western
Industries, Inc., 666 F.2d 800, 801 (3d Cir. 1981); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Casse 302 F.2d
132, 135-36 (10th Cir. 1962).
24 For examples of state courts addressing jurisdictional veil piercing, see Sternberg
v. ONei 550 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Del. 1988); Wise v. State Board for Examination, Qualifica-
tion & Registration of Architects, 274 S.E.2d 544, 547 (Ga. 1981); BMC Software Belgium,
N.V v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 797 (Tex. 2002); Schwartz v. Frankenhoff 733 A.2d 74,
76 (Vt. 1999); Bowers v. Wurzburg, 519 S.E.2d 148, 156 (W. Va. 1999).
25 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
151-70 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing the incorporation of substantive law into the jurisdic-
tional inquiry in the context of international civil litigation).
26 See infra Part I.C (stating that courts often approve these arguments and blur
the distinctions between statutory and constitutional restrictions on suits).
27 See infra text accompanying notes 31-33 (discussing some leading academic
works that favor employing the veil-piercing doctrine for jurisdictional purposes).
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law, which treats the corporation separately from its owners and affili-
ates.28 Nonetheless, his endorsement of "enterprise liability," as it is
applied for jurisdictional purposes, relies unavoidably on an attribu-
tive jurisdictional model. 29  Indeed, the status-based jurisdictional
scheme he advocates is indifferent to the lack of direct connection be-
tween the defendant and the forum."
In contrast to Blumberg's position, Lea Brilmayer and Kathleen
Paisley, authors of the leading academic exegesis of Cannon and its
progeny, argue in favor of employing substantive law, including the
veil-piercing doctrine, to determine whether a constitutional basis ex-
ists for exercising jurisdiction. 3' To their credit, Brilmayer and Paisley
were the first to closely analyze the subject. Their article, which has
had considerable influence on courts and the practicing bar, carefully
parses the case law to identify how substantive law has been employed
in the jurisdictional equation.32 Their study, however, also has had the
unfortunate effect of lending scholarly imprimatur to the use of veil-
piercing law for jurisdictional ends. Following suit, nearly all other
commentators also have accepted that the corporate law doctrine of
28 See BLUMBERG, supra note 19, at 25 (noting that the entity theory is outmoded
and not in touch with economic reality).
29 See infra text accompanying notes 189-205 (arguing that Blumberg and courts
following him reject Cannon only insofar as it applied a formalistic test but still accept,
without further qualification, use of substantive law for jurisdictional purposes).
30 See BLUMBERG supra note 19, at 460 (concluding that it is appropriate for juris-
diction to depend not on a direct connection between the defendant and the forum
but on "[c]oncern with the enterprise as a whole-with the extent of centralized con-
trol and economic integration" and on basic procedural policies such as "the reason-
able expectation by a foreign constituent deriving income from the forum that it might
be haled into court in the distant jurisdiction"). For this reason, and others, I do not
favor an enterprise liability framework as an alternative to the prevailing model of vi-
carious jurisdiction. See infta Part III (arguing that courts are capable of focusing on
the jurisdictional inquiry exclusively based on a parent's connection to the litigation in
specific jurisdiction cases and its own contacts with the forum state in general jurisdic-
tion cases); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 67 (1996)
("Blumberg has attempted to specify the boundaries of the firm based on 'the degree
of economic integration [within the corporate] group.'... Ultimately, he fails to spec-
ify what constitutes 'economic integration' or to address the issue of whether enter-
prises are in fact separable from one another." (alteration in original) (citations omit-
ted)).
31 See Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal
Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1, 28 (1986) ("[D]ue
process should take into account only bona fide state substantive relations, and it
should truncate such substantive relations only in certain limited circumstances.").
32 See, e.g., Third Nat'l Bank v. WEDGE Group Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1094 (6th Cir.
1989) (Keith, J., concurring) (citing Brilmayer and Paisley's work in upholding juris-
diction over the named defendant based, inter alia, on the indirect attribution of con-
tacts). For a more complete list of authorities citing their work, see infra note 63.
2004] 1031
1032 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 152: 1023
veil piercing may be invoked to justify the exercise ofjurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant:
I argue in these pages, against the grain of judicial and academic
wisdom, that the use of veil piercing for jurisdictional purposes is
unwarranted as a matter of precedent and unwise as a matter of pol-
icy. Part I begins with a note on the tripartite jurisdictional test and
discusses the particular relevance of agency principles to the applica-
tion of the jurisdictional inquiry. Having laid this foundation, it then
takes a new look at an old case. Part II argues that the predominant
view of the lower courts and commentators is wrong: Cannon does
not support using the substantive law of veil piercing for vicarious
jurisdictional ends. The historian Edward Purcell has shown how ju-
dicial decisions can be, and often are, interpreted beyond their his-
torical context over time.34 Similar to his decision in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins,3 5 Justice Brandeis's opinion for a unanimous court in Can-
non has been pulled from its historical moorings. Setting the record
straight may help both to improve the understanding of the case and
to clarify the limits of its intended reach in the modern era.
Finally, in Part III, I leave the question of the proper interpreta-
tion of Cannon to one side and focus instead on constructing the case
against the use of veil piercing in the evaluation of jurisdiction. In
this Part, I offer two arguments againstjurisdictional veil piercing: the
33 For examples of academic commentators stating that piercing the corporate veil
of a subsidiary can lead tojurisdiction over the parent, see Michael H. Cardozo, A New
Footnote in Erie v. Tompkins: "Cannon is Overruled," 36 N.C. L. REV. 181, 183 (1958);
J. J. Fawcett, Jurisdiction and Subsidiaries, 1985 J. Bus. L. 16, 25; Michael G. Albano,
Note, Agency As a Means of Obtaining Jurisdiction in New York over Foreign Corporations: A
Failed Theory, 20 BROOK. J. INIT'L L. 169, 174 (1993); Meryl Berger, Case Comment, ju-
risdiction over a Foreign Corporation on the Basis of its Subsidiary's Activities in New York: Bu-
lova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 9 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 91, 101-11 (1983); Daniel G.
Brown, Comment, Jurisdiction over a Corporation on the Basis of the Contacts of an Affiliated
Corporation: Do You Have to Pierce the Corporate Veil?, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 595, 603-04
(1992); Murray E. Knudsen, Comment, Jurisdiction over a Corporation Based on the Con-
tacts of a Related Corporation: Time for a Rule of Attribution, 92 DIcK. L. REV. 917, 919
(1988); Daniel I. Reith, Comment, Jurisdiction over Parent Corporations, 51 CAL. L. REV.
574, 580-81 (1963); William A. Voxman, Comment, jurisdiction over a Parent Corporation
in its Subsidiary's State of Incorporation, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 343-44 (1992). But see
Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 531, 557-58 (1995) (criticizing the use of veil piercing in the jurisdictional con-
text).
See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CON-
STITUTION: ERIE, THEJUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 3 (2000) (contending that the judges and academic
commentators interpreting Erie have failed to give the decision's historical position
due regard).
35 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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first is pragmatic and the second is normative. Building on the work
of corporate law scholars, my pragmatic argument focuses on the in-
determinacy of veil piercing and the attendant consequences of im-
porting this troubled substantive doctrine into the jurisdictional equa-
tion. In constructing the normative case, I argue that when veil
piercing is not an inquiry into a defendant's own involvement in the
underlying dispute, we have moved far from any meaningful connec-
tion between the application of substantive law and the sound ration-
ale for exercising jurisdiction.
My ultimate claim is not that the abandonment of the use of veil
piercing for jurisdictional purposes will fix all that ails modern juris-
dictional doctrine. To the contrary, abandoning the use of jurisdic-
tional veil piercing may make the blemishes in the law of personal ju-
risdiction more readily apparent. Requiring courts to focus on a
defendant's own involvement with the forum is more likely to produce
decisions consistent with the rationale that should support modern
jurisdictional doctrine. This modest, but vital, reexamination of the
law of jurisdiction then may serve as a catalyst for greater clarity in
thinking about the general policy goals underlying jurisdictional law
and how these objectives are best accomplished within our peculiar
American federation.
I. THE TRIPARTITE NATURE OFJURISDICTIONAL INQUIRIES
It helps to think about the problem of vicarious jurisdiction by
specifying the precise steps courts must take in determining the scope
ofjudicial authority in any jurisdictional inquiry. In doing so, we can
also identify the first two steps in the jurisdictional inquiry as the
weakest points in the argument forjurisdictional veil piercing.
A. The Question of Notice
The first question in an examination of the judicial power over a
defendant concerns notice. Before she may be bound by the judg-
ment of the court, a defendant is statutorily and constitutionally enti-
tled to formal notice through service of process of the commence-
ment of legal proceedings against her:M To determine whether a
defendant received adequate notice, a court must first evaluate the
manner of service that the state (or federal) legislature has statutorily
36 See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988)
("Service of process refers to a formal delivery of documents that is legally sufficient to
charge the defendant with notice of a pending action.").
10332004]
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prescribed. Unless the defendant consents to suit in the state or is
physically served while located therein, the plaintiff must identify
some statutory authority for service of process on a nonresident.7 As-
suming the technical statutory predicates for effecting service are sat-
isfied (i.e., mailed to the correct address, served by the proper official,
delivered in the proper form at the proper time), then a court will
find service valid, unless the method runs afoul of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause requires
that notice be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
,,381them an opportunity to present their objections.
Even in this initial inquiry, agency principles play a role in the
determination of proper notice. Service of process statutes that refer-
ence the term "agent" typically permit service on a person authorized
as an agent for purposes of giving notice. In the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, for example, service is proper on an individual by per-
sonally delivering a copy directly to the individual "or by delivering a
copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process"3 9 Rule 4(h) pro-
vides a comparable formulation for service on corporations and asso-
40ciations. Identifying who is "an agent authorized by appointment"
under Rule 4 usually poses few difficulties since most courts require
an actual appointment to receive process in order to validate service. 4 ,
The meaning of "agent by law" is more problematic, however. Some
courts limit the scope of "agent by law" only to persons authorized by
42statute to accept service of process. By contrast, other courts take a
more expansive view of the phrase, permitting the invocation of state
common law of agency43 or the veil-piercing doctrine to validate
37 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 4(e) (2003) (listing Colorado's service of process
alternatives for nonresidents).
38 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
39 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e).
40 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(h).
41 See 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1097 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing how actual appointment as an agent is
necessary for valid service).
42 See id. § 1098 (noting that several decisions construe agency by law to mean leg-
islative authorization to receive process).
43 Few opinions, however, address the choice of law problem which arises from
relying on state common law when measuring the validity of service on an agent within
the meaning of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court's decision
in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1964), certainly
suggests that state common law doctrine has no role to play in the definition of the
term "agent" within the meaning of the federal service rules. "[E]ven if we were to
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service on a designated, corporate representative as effective on the
affiliated entity.
44
B. State and Nonconstitutional Federal Bases ofJurisdiction
After determining whether there was proper service, the court's
next step in the jurisdictional analysis is to determine whether state
(or nonconstitutional federal) law authorizes the forum court to exer-
cise jurisdiction over the defendant.45 It is necessary to distinguish this
statutory inquiry from the constitutional question of notice. The mat-
ter can be confusing because service of process statutes commonly set
forth both the mechanism for giving notice and the legislatively ap-
proved limits for exercising jurisdiction (by identifying the bases that
trigger a defendant's amenability to suit). If an out-of-state visitor
drives into the state and, while there, accidentally injures a pedestrian,
the second-step statutory question is whether the state has authorized
its courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident drivers who negli-
gently cause injury while in the forum. Indeed, all states have author-
ized this jurisdiction, either through a specific statute dealing with the
act (such as a nonresident motorist statute) or by a general long-arm
46
statute.
Regrettably, courts evaluating assertions of vicarious jurisdiction
often fail to maintain the distinction between service of process for
purposes of giving notice and a statutory basis for amenability to suit.
Of course, courts undertaking traditional jurisdictional inquiries are
hardly immune from mistake, but many of the problems seen in the
vicarious jurisdiction cases are distinct. The use of agency principles
in such cases has been particularly troubling.
assume that this [Rule 4] uniform federal standard should give way to contrary local
policies, there is no relevant concept of state law which would invalidate the agency
here at issue." Id.
44 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, § 1104 (describing how "[s]ervice on a
proper agent of a subsidiary corporation may constitute sufficient service on the parent
corporation").
For an example of a court's reliance on this next step in the jurisdictional analy-
sis, see Omni Capital International, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987):
Before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant,
the procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.... [This
means] there must be more than notice to the defendant and a constitution-
ally sufficient relationship between the defendant and the forum. There also
must be a basis for the defendant's amenability to service of summons.
Id.
46 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-1-124(1)(b) (West 2003) (stating that the "com-
mission of a tortious act within th[e] state" is a sufficient basis to come within the state
court's jurisdiction).
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At one time, in-state service was necessary forjurisdiction because
of the territorial limitations imposed by the power theory. 47 Today,
service and jurisdiction are separate, 8 but courts evaluating vicarious
jurisdiction assertions sometimes conflate the term "agent," as it ap-
pears in service statutes, with the term "agency," contained in many
long-arm statutes. Where long-arm statutes mention "agency," the
term is typically used to define the breadth of the state court's juris-
dictional authority. For instance, the New York long-arm statute be-
gins with the clause: "As to a cause of action arising from any of the
acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal juris-
diction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator,
who in person or through an agent ....,,4,. The language of the stat-
ute suggests that the New York legislature authorized state courts to
exercise jurisdiction not only over those who act personally, but also
over those who make express arrangements to act through another.50
Even where the legislature intended the jurisdiction authority in a
particular long-arm statute to be applied more expansively through
the use of the term "agent" or "instrumentality," it must remembered
that specific jurisdiction is almost always the only authorized form
of jurisdictional authority. 5" Judicial incorporation of agency, veil
47 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) ("The authority of every tribunal
is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State .... Any attempt to exercise
authority beyond those limits would be... an illegitimate usurpation of power . .
48 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgments in personam is
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his
presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its
rendition of a judgment personally binding him. But now that the capias ad
respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of
notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it ....
ld.
49 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney Supp. 2004).
50 See also KAN,. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b) (2002) ("Any person, whether or not a citi-
zen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent or instrumentality does any
of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits the person and, if an individual,
the individual's personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as
to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of these acts" (emphasis added));
TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 2004) ("In addition to other acts
that may constitute doing business, a nonresident does business in this state if the non-
resident.., recruits Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in
this state, for employment inside or outside this state.").
51 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney 2003) (permitting personal jurisdiction
over a nondomiciliary only "as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts [within
the state] enumerated in this section" of the statute).
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piercing, or other substantive doctrines used to invoke amenability for
general jurisdiction purposes, therefore, does not honor the legisla-
tive intent. Unfortunately, even express language limiting state court
authority to specific jurisdiction has not thwarted judicial efforts to
expand jurisdictional reach through reliance on veil piercing. 2
Regarding both the statutory notice question and the question of
statutory amenability, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires federal courts to apply the forum state's substantive law in all
diversity cases and in most federal question cases as well . A legisla-
tive body defines the breadth ofjudicial authority at less than the al-
lowable constitutional maximum, presumably, at least in part, because
it seeks to give some guidance to outsiders concerning what conduct
will trigger amenability to suit in the forum.54 If the legislature de-
cides not to extend the reach of its courts to the permissible limits of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the application of a federal common law
standard of vicarious jurisdiction (effectively broadening the territo-
rial reach of the courts) redraws a boundary clearly within the prov-
ince of the state legislature to mark.55 Courts should not read into a
service or long-arm statute that which lawmakers have chosen not to
write.
C. Federal Constitutional Limits to Jurisdiction
The third and final step in a court's jurisdictional inquiry is to de-
termine whether the exercise ofjurisdiction is constitutionally permis-
sible. A court only reaches this final issue after satisfying the notice
and statutory amenability questions. Returning to the example of
52 See, e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l., Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851, 852-53 (N.Y.
1967) (upholding the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign parent corpora-
Lion based on the veil-piercing theory despite statutory language limiting state court
authority to specific jurisdiction).
53 See FED. R. Ctv. P. 4(k) (1) (A) (providing that "[s]ervice of a summons or filing
a waiver of service is effective to establish jurisdiction over the person of a defendant
who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state
in which the district court is located").
54 See William B. Fisch & Richard S. Kay, The Constitutionalization of Law in the
United States, 46 AM.J. COMP. L. 437, 459, 461 (Supp. 1988) (arguing that subconstitu-
tional law making "is prospective and rational and it usually draws its solutions to the
issues at hand from fairly well-defined estimates of public policy, informed by a healthy
regard for public opinion" and that, by comparison, "[t]he subjection of more and
more human activity to the ultimate control of the ad hoc, case-by-case judicial invoca-
tion of principle reduces the certainty and stability of law").
See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1333 (E.D.N.Y.
1981) (distinguishing judicial and legislative responsibilities with regards to the deter-
mination ofjurisdiction).
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the nonresident motorist, assuming proper notice and a statutory ba-
sis for exercising jurisdiction, the pertinent constitutional question is
whether the negligent operation of the car while in the forum state
establishes a sufficient connection between the defendant and the fo-
rum such that the exercise ofjurisdiction by a court within that forum
56would not offend due process.
Although states are free to give less than the maximum scope of
judicial authority to their courts, most have decided against it.57 In
these instances, where the legislature has linked the statutory grant of
judicial authority to the constitutional maximum, no separate evalua-
tion of legislative intent is usually necessary. Yet, there still remain
good reasons for breaking down the inquiries into separate parts
when questions of vicarious jurisdiction are at issue. Once again,
principles of agency law can readily be misapplied in this context.
As with the New York long-arm statute, a state statute may author-
ize amenability to suit in cases where the defendant acted through an
agent,s8 but the relevance of agency theory, if applicable at all, re-
mains limited to the question of the legislative restrictions placed on
judicial jurisdiction. Unfortunately, courts undertaking vicarious ju-
risdiction inquiries also sometimes blur the distinction between the
question of statutory amenability to suit and the separate question of
whether exercise of the court's statutory authority is constitutionally
permissible.59 Of course, vicarious jurisdiction cases are not the only
occasions in which there is confusion between the statutory and
constitutional inquiries. ° The vicarious jurisdiction cases do offer a
56 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that due
process requires "certain minimum contacts" between the out-of-state defendant and
the forum state before defendant may be subject to in personam jurisdiction).
57 See generally 1 ROBERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM B. RICHMAN, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL
ACTIONS §§ 4-1 to -7 (LEXIS L. Publ'g, 3d ed. 1998) (1983) (cataloging and discussing
the history of state long-arm statutes that extend the scope of personal jurisdiction to
the limits of the Due Process Clause).
58 Supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
59 See, e.g., Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159-60 (5th Cir. 1983)
(recognizing that the jurisdictional inquiry was a question of interpretation of the
Texas long-arm statute, but then proceeding to analyze the statute by reference to the
Supreme Court's Due Process decision in Cannon); see also infra text accompanying
notes 159-77 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's misapplication of the Cannon constitutional
analysis to determine the proper interpretation of the Texas statute).
See Taylor v. Portland Paramount Corp., 383 F.2d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 1967) (cri-
tiquing courts that confuse statutory and constitutional portions of the jurisdiction test
by remarking that "[i]n effect, what these courts have done is to abdicate their duty to
construe the statutes of their own states"); see also CASAD & RICHIMAN, supra note 57,
§ 4-1, at 383-86 (critiquing judicial decisions that interpret "enumerated act-type" state
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powerful reminder, however, that failure to be methodical about each
step of the jurisdictional inquiry can produce confusing results. Even
when statutory amenability to suit appears to collapse into the consti-
tutional inquiry, it is still helpful when considering vicarious jurisdic-
tion to keep the question of a defendant's amenability to suit as a
separate statutory matter from the question of whether the exercise of
61jurisdiction satisfies federal constitutional limits on judicial power.
Before undertaking a detailed discussion of vicarious jurisdiction,
it may be helpful to note a few distinctions between my discussion and
the prevailing scholarship on this issue. In Brilmayer and Paisley's ar-
ticle, the leading academic treatment of the use of veil piercing and
other substantive law for jurisdictional purposes, they use the terms
"merger," "attribution," and "substitution" to describe the case law in
this area.62 In preferring the phrase "vicarious jurisdiction," I depart
intentionally from the terminology and tripartite division favored by
Brilmayer and Paisley. This distinction is worth highlighting, first, be-
cause to the extent that a number of courts have adopted their terms
as the standard lexicon, the imprint of Brilmayer and Paisley's work
on the current debate over the boundaries of state courtjurisdiction is
63readily recognizable. Second, the difference between us is more
than merely semantic; it suggests a fundamental disagreement on the
precedential and policy legitimacy of vicarious jurisdiction assess-
ments.
long-arm statutes to extend to the limits of due process as "not faithful to the legislative
intent").
61 For an example of scholars arguing that states should not link statutory amena-
bility to suit with due process limits, see Fisch & Kay, supra note 54, at 459-62 (discuss-
ing problems associated with overconstitutionalizing judicial jurisdiction analysis). See
also Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century or Beginning of the
Millennium, 7 TUL.J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 111, 113-14 (1999) (explaining the domestic
and international costs associated with linking state law and constitutional jurisdic-
tional inquiries).
62 Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 31.
63 For decisions citing Brilmayer and Paisley's work, see Third National Bank v.
WEDGE Group Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1094 (6th Cir. 1989) (Keith, J., concurring); Metro-
Goldwyn-MayerStudios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2003);
International Bancorp, L.L. C. v. Societe Des Bains De Mer Et Du Cercle Des Estrangers A Mon-
aco, 192 F. Supp. 2d 467, 477 n.19 (E.D. Va. 2002); Bradley v. Mayo Foundation, No. 97-
204, 1999 WL 1032806, at *15 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 10, 1999); Gruca v. Alpha Therapeutic
Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 862, 866 (N.D. II. 1998); In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 953
F. Supp. 909, 916-18 (S.D. Ohio 1997); In re Harvard Industries, Inc., 173 B.R. 82, 89
(Bankr. D. Del. 1994); Applied Biosystems, Inc. v. Cruachem, Ltd., 772 F. Supp. 1458, 1464
(D. Del. 1991); Magnecomp Corp. v. Athene Co., 257 Cal. Rptr. 278, 283 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989); Sternberg v. ONeil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1120 n.28, 1126 n.45 (Del. 1988); Red Sail
Easter Ltd. v. Radio City Music Hall Productions, Inc., No. 12036, 1992 WL 171420, at *3
(Del. Ch.July 17, 1992); Schwartz v. Frankenhoff 733 A.2d 74, 80 (Vt. 1999).
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Brilmayer and Paisley argue that the most cogent way to compre-
hend this body of jurisdictional decisions is to divide them into three
categories, which they label as "attribution," "merger," and "substitu-
tion" cases." As they put it:
First, the legal relationship may be such that it is reasonable to attribute
the jurisdictional contacts of one party to the other.... Second, the legal
relationship between two apparently separate entities may be such that
in reality the two entities are one; their separate identities are merged.
The contacts of the first defendant are also the contacts of the second
because there is in reality only one defendant. Third, under some cir-
cumstances, the party over which there is jurisdiction may be substituted
for a party over which there is not.6"
Using the parent-subsidiary relationship as an illustrative example,
Brilmayer and Paisley contend that attribution and merger are similar
"in that both involve disregarding separate entity status and shifting
responsibility for the subsidiary's actions onto the parent. The differ-
ence between attribution and merger lies in the extent of this shifting
of responsibility. " 6 As they explain further:
Under the attribution theory, only the precise conduct shown to be in-
stigated by the parent is attributed to the parent; the rest of the subsidi-
ary's actions still pertain only to the subsidiary. The two corporations
remain distinct entities. If merger is shown, however, all of the activities
of the subsidiary are by definition activities of the parent. Merger re-
quires a greater showing of interconnectedness than attribution, but
once shown, its scope is broader.
6
7
I agree that the term attribution captures well the courts' conduct
in these cases, which is why I observed earlier that it may be synony-
mous with vicarious in this context. It is difficult to see, however, how
drawing a distinction between attribution and merger makes sense,
much less how it helps to understand the case law in the field. In
merger, as in attribution, the jurisdictionally sufficient contacts of one
person or entity are attributed to another; in both instances the exer-
cise ofjurisdiction is vicarious.6
64 Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 31, at 2.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 12.
67 Id.
68 Moreover, I question the idea that merger is more permanent than attribution,
a point Brilmayer and Paisley offer as a further distinction between the two types. See
id. at 12 (discussing the fact that while attribution only applies to "precise conduct
shown to be instigated by the parent," merger results in a more enduring connection
because "all of the activities of the subsidiary are by definition activities of the parent").
Ajudicial finding of agency to support attribution or a finding ofjustified veil piercing
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The more fundamental problem with Brilmayer and Paisley's at-
tempt to divide the cases into neat categories is that their objective in
doing so is not merely descriptive. Behind their tripartite division lies
an assumption that the use of any substantive law, including veil-
piercing doctrine, for jurisdictional ends is justified both as a matter
of precedent and policy."9 In short, Brilmayer and Paisley fail to ques-
tion the validity-under existing law or as a policy matter-of using
veil-piercing doctrine to measure the due process limits of jurisdic-
tion. Instead, they suggest that where substantive law would allow the
court to pierce the corporate veil, jurisdiction over the absent parent
should "follow automatically.",70 Their work, however, does not at-
tempt to build a theoretical justification for incorporating veil pierc-
ing into the jurisdictional analysis. Why is it ever appropriate to exer-
cise jurisdiction over an absent parent company based on the
allegation that its forum subsidiary was undercapitalized? What do the
criteria for veil piercing have to do with the justifications for making
the nonresident defendant amenable to suit in the forum? What, for
instance, does a failure by the parent to follow corporate formalities,
to hold regular shareholder meetings, or to adequately capitalize its
subsidiary-to use several commonly cited criteria courts invoke in
deciding whether to veil pierce7'-have to do with the underlying
to support merger applies only in the specific case in which it is made. Neither finding
would extend beyond the bounds of the particular case, except to the extent allowed
by resjudicata and collateral estoppel principles. Indeed, it is not clear that the use of
an agency or veil-piercing conclusion as a predicate for justifying the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over an absent defendant could be invoked with preclusive effect,
even as a law of the case determination in the same suit. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIv. P.
120a(2) (Vernon 2003) ("No determination of any issue of fact in connection with the
objection to jurisdiction is a determination of the merits of the case or any aspect
thereof.").
69 Brilmayer and Paisley's central criticism of the case law as it has developed in
this field is that courts often uphold "quasi-substantive" rules for jurisdictional pur-
poses. Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 31, at 23. A "quasi-substantive rule," by their
reckoning, is a rule that is applied to extend the jurisdictional reach of the state court
over a nonresident even though the corresponding state substantive rule would not
impose liability on a similarly situated resident. Id. If the governing substantive state
corporate law would not regard a nonresident, D1, as the alter ego of a forum resident,
then the state's courts ought not be able to exercise jurisdiction over DI by applying a
less stringent alter ego standard forjurisdictional purposes. Id. at 34.
70 See id. at 12 (observing that "there might be reasons such as undercapitalization,
to disregard the formal corporate boundaries in which case jurisdiction over the par-
ent would follow automatically").
71 See infra text accompanying notes 268-86 (arguing that the criteria relevant to
disregarding the corporate form is almost always unconnected with the harm sustained
by the victim or the defendant's relationship with the forum).
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reasons why a forum court should be able to exercise jurisdiction over
the parent?
72
Before we can begin to take up these questions, it is necessary to
turn our attention first to Cannon, which was the earliest occasion in
which the Court considered the validity of using veil-piercing law in
the jurisdictional test. As we will see, the case has profoundly influ-
enced the shape of modern jurisdictional doctrine.
II. REEXAMINING THE COURT'S DECISIONAL LAW
Conventional wisdom among the lower courts today is that the
Cannon Court approved-in theory, if not by its actual holding-the
use of veil-piercing doctrine in measuring the limits of judicial juris-
diction. In this Part, I challenge this long accepted notion. To de-
velop the argument, however, it is necessary to begin by reviewing the
state ofjurisdictional doctrine as it existed at the time Cannon was de-
cided.
A. Historical Evolution of a Doctrine
At the time the Court heard oral argument in Cannon, the theory
on which the Supreme Court predicated American judicial jurisdic-
tion was the principle of territoriality. This theory, most explicitly
articulated by Justice Field in Pennoyer v. Neff,74 effectively limited the
exercise ofjudicial power to state borders in virtually all cases.7 5
Primarily, Justice Field's formulations of the power theory made
the jurisdictional rules easy to apply but also terribly inflexible. Rec-
ognizing the inherent difficulties of a strict territoriality regime, even
72 For similar reasons, I disagree with the necessity of including substitution, as
Brilmayer and Paisley have done, to describe a third category of cases. Substitution,
according to Brilmayer and Paisley, occurs when jurisdiction is exercised over a defen-
dant whose liability is based on an express statutory authorization. Brilmayer & Paisley,
supra note 31, at 22-23. The paradigmatic example of substitution is a direct action
statute that allows an insurance company to be named as the defendant rather than
the insured. Yet, where liability is authorized by a specific statutory mandate, a defen-
dant's amenability to suit in the forum based on that statutory liability is direct and un-
remarkable. Consequently, the justification for distinguishing substitution cases from
merger or attribution cases remains obscure.
73 See, e.g., In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 245 F. Supp. 2d 280, 291 (D.
Mass. 2003) (noting the "longstanding" common law presumption, presented in the
Cannon line of cases, of subsidiary independence and how it may be overcome).
74 95 U.S. 714, 726 (1878).
75 See id. at 722 ("[T]he laws of one state have no operation outside of its terri-
tory... and ... no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that terri-
tory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions.").
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the Pennoyer court did not adhere unwaveringly to the power theory.
After articulating a seemingly absolute rule that made jurisdiction co-
terminous with the state's territorial limits, Justice Field noted that
76there were exceptions to the rule. One of the exceptions Field ar-
ticulated ("[t]o prevent any misapplication of the views expressed in
this opinion, 77) was that the power theory should not be read to
trump the state's "absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon
which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created,
and the causes for which it may be dissolved., 78 The state's right to de-
fine such matters of status as "marriage" was not the only exception to
the strict power theory. The other major exception to the power the-
ory of jurisdiction Field articulated in Pennoyer concerned corpora-
tions.79
Subjecting individuals to suit posed (and poses) no challenge for
jurisdictional theory. An individual merely need be present in the
physical space of the forum, even if only for a fleeting moment in
time, for effective in-state service, both as a traditional basis for exer-
cising jurisdiction and to give formal notice of suit.s° Dealing with
corporate defendants, however, proved more problematic for the
power theory."' Because in-state service was thought necessary to
bring the defendant within the power of the court, it was necessary to
fix the place where the corporate entity was located, or "present," in
order to decide whether it could be served in the forum. The simple
expedient of legislative fiat readily resolved that problem for domestic
corporations. In exchange for the privilege of incorporating in the
state and receiving whatever benefits and rights are attendant to that
chartering, the state could (and may still, even today) decree that the
domestic corporation expressly consent to suit in the forum. This is
accomplished through the practical tool of requiring the corporation
76 Id. at 734-35.
77 Id. at 734.
78 Id. at 734-35.
79 See id. at 735 (articulating the exception that a state may require, (and later en-
force such contract) a partnership or association within its limits to appoint an agent
or representative to receive process).
80 See Burnham v. Superior Court of Ca., 495 U.S. 604, 616-22 (1990) (upholding
jurisdiction over a party who made a few short visits to a state for the purposes of con-
ducting business and visiting children); Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 444-47
(E.D. Ark. 1959) (upholdingjurisdiction over a defendant served while travelling in an
airplane over the forum state's airspace).
81 See generally Philip Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In
Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 577-86 (1958) (exploring the
inadequacies of the "consent," "presence," and "doing business" theories of jurisdic-
tion over corporate defendants).
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812to appoint an agent for purposes of in-state service of process or, fail-
ing such appointment, to enact a substitute service rule to allow serv-
ice on a state official in place of personal service on a company repre-
sentative. 3 In addition to consent, domicile provided another basis
on which the power theory could be predicated for domestic corpora-
tions since in-state chartering could serve as the corporate analogue to
rules that fixed an individual's domicile in the forum.
The sticky wicket for the power theory concerned what to do with
the foreign corporation. Unlike the domestic corporation, the for-
eign corporation's consent (fictional or otherwise) could not be predi-
cated on the grant of a charter, and, for similar reasons, the foreign
entity obviously could not be treated as a domiciliary of the forum.
The initial notion was to require similar commitments from the for-
eign corporation by insisting on registration and appointment of an
agent in exchange for the right to conduct in-state business (along
with an implied-in-law appointment of a state official as agent for serv-
84ice in the event of a failure to comply with these conditions). By at
least 1910, however, the state could no longer exclude foreign corpo-
rations from conducting interstate business within its borders, thereby
invalidating any conditional impositions of express or implied consent
• 85
to suit.
To fill this gap, the theory of "presence" was developed under
which any corporation was deemed to be present, and therefore sub-
86ject to the court's power, when doing business in the forum. The
82 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 132 (2002) (requiring every corporation to
have and maintain a registered agent in the state for service of process purposes).
83 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735 ("Nor do we doubt that a State, on creating corpora-
tions or other institutions for pecuniary or charitable purposes, may provide a mode in
which their conduct may be investigated, their obligations enforced, or their charters
revoked, which shall require other than personal service upon their officers or mem-
bers.").
84 For example, the Supreme Court in St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882),
asserted:
The State may, therefore, impose as a condition upon which a foreign corpo-
ration shall be permitted to do business within her limits, that it shall stipulate
that in any litigation arising out of its transactions in the State, it will accept as
sufficient the service of process on its agents or persons specially desig-
nated .... And such condition and stipulation may be implied as well as ex-
pressed.
Id.
85 See Int'l Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 108 (1910) (holding that a state
statute that imposed restrictions on foreign corporations conducting business within
the state was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce).
86 See, e.g., Int'l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 583 (1914) (citing St.
Louis Southwestern Ry v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 226 (1913), for the proposition that
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presence theory, however, proved problematic in practice. How much
business must a corporation conduct in a forum in order to be found
present within it? The methods of measuring "doing business" proved
inexact and uncertain. As Judge Learned Hand once observed, "[i]t is
quite impossible to establish any rule from the decided cases; we must
step from tuft to tuft across the morass."8 ' Even when it could be
shown that the necessary quantum of business activity existed, the
corporation typically was subject to suit only for claims arising out of
the business it conducted in the state and only for so long as the busi-
ness continued. Once the business ceased, no finding of presence
could be sustained.88
As the years passed, a growing sense of dissatisfaction with the fic-
titious nature of the Court's jurisdictional doctrines began to appear
both in lower court opinions"9 and academic commentaries. 90 Not-
withstanding these concerns, in 1925, the doctrines of consent and
presence, though imperfect, provided the only means to avoid the
harsh results produced by a strict application of Pennoyer's power the-
ory. A foreign corporation could be compelled to appear in a distant
forum only if it had given consent (either express or implied) to suit
in the forum or was shown to be present in the forum by virtue of hav-
ing done business there. Into this breach, the litigants in Cannon ar-
rived.
"in order to render a corporation amenable to service of process in a foreign jurisdic-
tion it must appear that the corporation is transacting business in that district to such
an extent as to subject it to thejurisdiction and laws thereof").
87 Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1930).
88 See Chipman, Ltd. v. Thomas B. Jeffery Co., 251 U.S. 373, 378-80 (1920) (hold-
ing that the presence of a business agent, in compliance with state law, was not enough
to establish jurisdiction if that business and the source of the underlying claim were no
longer present in the forum state).89
See, e.g., Smolik v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y.
1915) (blaming the "legal fiction" demanded by personal jurisdiction doctrine for mis-
leading arguments presented to the court).
90 See 2 GERARD CARL HENDERSON, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American
Constitutional Law, in HARVARD STUDIES INJURISPRUDENCE 1, 77-100 (1918) (criticizing
traditional doctrine denying corporations' presence outside their states of incorpora-
tion and the resulting, contradictory doctrine of implied contracts); William F. Cahill,
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations and Individuals who Carry on Business Within the Terri-
tory, 30 HARv. L. REV. 676, 686-96 (1917) (arguing that presence, not consent, is the
true and logical foundation of jurisdiction and should be treated as such); Austin W.
Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State, 32 HARV. L. REV. 871,
889 (1919) (critiquing the Supreme Court's interpretation of a corporation's decision
to do business within a state as consent to jurisdiction in that state).
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B. Cotton Sheeting and the Supreme Court
In February 1922, the Cannon Manufacturing Company (later the
Cannon Mills Company) instituted a civil suit for breach of contract
in a North Carolina state court against the Cudahy Packing Com-91
pany. Cannon was a relatively small cotton manufacturing com-
pany.9 By comparison, the Cudahy Packing Company had extensive
business operations throughout the country,93 and even internation-
ally.94  In 1890, Cudahy, then known as the Armour-Cudahy Co.,
95
had $13,471,000 in sales and 1500 employees. In 1920, the company
was capitalized at over $25,000,000. 96 A Maine corporation with its
91 See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 292 F. 169, 170 (W.D.N.C. 1923)
(recounting the prior history of the case).
John W. Harden, Cannon: The Story of Cannon Mills Company-90 Years
of Textile Leadership and Innovation, 1887-1977, at 1 (1974) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). J.W. Cannon founded the company in 1887 in Mecklen-
burg County, North Carolina. Id. at 4. By the turn of the century, the company
had opened a mill on a thirty-four acre site in Kannapolis, North Carolina, the location
from which the cotton sheeting in its contract with Cudahy was produced. Id. at 5. Its
primary business was the manufacture of towels. Id. at 6. Although all operations were
in North Carolina, the company had opened sales offices in New York to market its
products, an unusual practice for a southern textile mill. Id. at 5. Cannon Manufac-
turing was reorganized into the Cannon Mills Company in 1928. Id. at 6. In 1986,
it was purchased by Fieldcrest Mills which, in turn, was acquired by the Pillowtex Cor-
poration in 1997. Id.; Pillowtex Corp., The Facts About Pillowtex, at http://www.
pillowtex.com/pr/PTX-FACTSHEET.htm (July 2003). After filing for bankruptcy
on July 30, 2003, Pillowtex terminated all positions, except twelve hundred, to assist
with employee communications, the wind down of its business, and disposition of its
assets. Press Release, Pillowtex Corp., Pillowtex Announces Employee Terminations
and Plant Closings (July 30, 2003), at http://www.pillowtex.com/pr/pr030730.htnl.
93 In addition to its corporate affiliates discussed below, Cudahy operated in
California, Connecticut, Nebraska, New Hampshire, NewJersey, New York, Ohio, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Affi-
davit of A.W. Anderson at 11, Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333
(1925) (No. 255) (on file with author); see also Cudahy Packaging Co., Cudahy Packing
Company as of 1920, at http://www.ov2000.com/scripophily-corp-pages/Food/Cudahy
%20Packing.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cudahy
Packaging Co., As of 1920].
94 Cudahy Packing Company was also the parent of Cudahy Company, Ltd., which
operated in London, England. Deposition of John F. Gearen Jr. at 16, Cannon Mfg.
Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925) (No. 255) (on file with author) [here-
inafter Gearen Deposition]. There is also an ambiguous reference in the deposition to
this subsidiary doing business in Australia, but it is never made clear and no other evi-
dence of corporate activity was discovered there. See id.
95 Loyola Univ. Chicago, University Archives: Michael Cudahy Science Hal at http://
www.luc.edu/depts/archives/cudsci.html (last visitedJan. 15, 2003).
96 See Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 6, Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267
U.S. 333 (1925) (No. 255) (describing the corporate structure of the Cudahy Packing
Co.) (on file with author) [hereinafter Brief of Plaintiff].
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principal place of business in Chicago, Cudahy was also the corporate
parent of a number of wholly owned subsidiaries throughout the
United States. These subsidiaries included the Cudahy Packing Com-
pany of Alabama, the Cudahy Packing Company of Nebraska, and the
Cudahy Packing Company of Louisiana, Ltd.97 Along with Swift, Ar-
mour, Morris and Wilson, Cudahy was one of the "Big Five" packing
98firms in the nation in the first part of this century. This moniker was
indelibly linked to the company following the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's investigation of the industry and the 1920 Packer Consent De-
cree, which all five signed. 99 As a prominent player in an industry
exposed by Upton Sinclair in The Jungle'° for its inhumane and vil-
lainous practices, Cudahy was a corporate Goliath that stood in stark
contrast to the more modest North Carolina cotton manufacturer.
The subject of the suit between Cannon and Cudahy concerned a
contract signed in 1919, in which Cannon agreed to supply cotton
sheeting for use in Cudahy's meatpacking operations."" Cotton sheet-
ing was used as a shroud for wrapping the beef and pork products that
packers like Cudahy shipped.0 2 After the animals had been slaugh-
tered, the cotton shroud was pulled tight over each carcass to smooth
out the fat and make it more cosmetically appealing. °3 If the carcass
had a yellow tint, resulting from the animal's diet of primarily oats or
wheat, the cotton shroud also could be dipped in warm salt water
before being placed on the meat to whiten its appearance.14
The 1919 contract was not the first business deal between the two
parties. For several years prior to this agreement, Cannon had
supplied cotton sheeting to Cudahy pursuant to several short-term
supply contracts. Each of these contracts bound Cudahy to fulfill all
of its cotton sheeting needs, within a specified minimum and maxi-
mum range, from Cannon. On every prior occasion, Cudahy had
97 See id.; Cudahy Packing Company, As of)920, supra note 93 (chronicling Cudahy's
large operations).
98 KENNETH M. MATHEWS JR. ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., U.S. BEEF INDUSTRY:
CATTLE CYCLES, PRICE SPREADS, AND PACKER CONCENTRATION 9 (Apr. 1999), available
at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/tb1874/tb1874e.pdf (last visited Jan. 15,
2003).
99 Id.
100 UPTON SINCLAIR, THEJUNGLE 3-41 (Viking Press 1950) (1905).
101 Plaintiffs Complaint at 4-5, Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267
U.S. 333 (1925) (No. 255) (on file with author) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Complaint].
102 Id. 4.
103 Interview with Milton Freedman, Freedman Packing Company (Feb. 26, 2002)
(on file with author).
104 Id.
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purchased the maximum quantity of the cotton fabric that Cannon
committed to furnish.1 0 5 The 1919 contract contained terms similar to
those of the earlier contracts. It obligated Cudahy to purchase "its en-
tire requirements of cotton fabric" from Cannon, not to exceed
750,000 yards from January through September 1920.106 On this occa-
sion, however, Cudahy apparently no longer desired to purchase the
maximum quantity of cotton sheeting. Cannon alleged in its original
complaint that Cudahy had ordered and paid for less than 50,000
yards before it refused to accept any further shipments. 10 7 Cannon
sought damages in the amount of $49,000.108
To effectuate service on Cudahy, Cannon delivered a summons to
the deputy sheriff of Mecklenburg County to be served on Frank H.
Ross of Charlotte, North Carolina.09 Ross was an employee of the
subsidiary, Cudahy Packing Company of Alabama, but he held no po-
sition with the parent company, the only named defendant in the ac-
tion.110 Cudahy Packing Company of Alabama had a branch office in
Charlotte, North Carolina, and was qualified to do business there."'
Ross was the designated agent for service of process in North Caro-
lina.1 2 On the same day the deputy sheriff received the summons, he
served it on Ross.113 In its original complaint, Cannon averred that
Ross was the right person to serve because Cudahy was doing business
105 Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 101, 14.
100 Id. 1 5.
107 Id. 1 7.
108 Id. 1 9(3).
109 Id. at2.
110 See id. (identifying Ross as the "process agent of Cudahy Company of Ala-
bama"). It is notable that the plaintiff apparently concluded it lacked any legal claim
against the subsidiary. Therefore, it did not name the Alabama company as a code-
fendant. For a discussion of the principle of a liability predicate before jurisdiction
may be exercised, see infra text accompanying notes 307-25.
I Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 292 F. 169, 170, 172-73 (W.D.N.C.
1923); Gearen Deposition, supra note 94, at 18.
112 Cannon Mfg. Co., 292 F. at 170.
113 Id. We may presume he was served in Mecklenberg County, but the return of
service does not directly confirm this fact. If he had been served in North Carolina,
but outside of the Western District, a nice procedural problem might have arisen. As
Stephen Burbank has noted, "[p] rior to the Federal Rules, and except where otherwise
provided by Act of Congress, the territorial jurisdiction of the federal courts in in per-
sonam actions was restricted to the district of which a defendant was an inhabitant or in
which he could be found." Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1015, 1172 n.673 (1982). It is unclear whether the federal court would
have regarded the in-state, but outside of the district, service pursuant to the state serv-
ice statute as insufficient to confer territorial authority over the defendant upon re-
moval of the case to district court.
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in North Carolina "directly and through [its] subsidiary corpora-
tion.""' Although North Carolina had a statute authorizing service on
the secretary of state for any corporation "having property or doing
business" in the state when the corporation failed to appoint an offi-
cer or agent upon whom process could be served, ' ' Cannon chose not
to invoke that statutory provision."'
Following service on Ross, the litigation process moved quickly.
Only two weeks after service of the lawsuit, lawyers for Cudahy filed a
special appearance objecting to the exercise of personal jurisdiction
by the North Carolina court and, simultaneously, removed the suit to
federal court.
When Cannon instituted this proceeding against it, Cudahy was
certainly no stranger to litigation. Indeed, Cudahy had already been a
party in a number of cases before the United States Supreme Court."'
114 Plaintiffs Complaint, supra note 101, 3.
115 See Lunceford v. Commercial Travelers' Mut. Accident Ass'n, 129 S.E. 805, 805-
07 (N.C. 1925) (citing the North Carolina long-arm statute extant at the time Cannon
was decided, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1137 (1901), and upholding service on a foreign cor-
poration through service on the secretary of state where defendant insurance company
was deemed to be "doing business" in the state).
116
We can only speculate as to the reasons why Cannon did not try to serve
Cudahy through the secretary of state based on an assertion that Cudahy itself was "do-
ing business" in North Carolina by virtue of the cotton sheeting supply contract it had
entered. Cannon may have believed it was unlikely that the court would find Cudahy
had been doing sufficient business in North Carolina to warrant the inference that it
was present for jurisdictional purposes. Only two years earlier, in Rosenberg Bros. & Co.
v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923), the Court had ruled that intermittent visits to
a state to make purchases by a foreign corporation, "even if occurring at regular inter-
vals, would not warrant the inference that the corporation was present within the juris-
diction of the State." Id. at 518. Of course, both the 1919 supply contract, as well as
the earlier supply contracts between Cannon and Cudahy, suggest a much higher and
continuous level of business involvement by Cudahy in North Carolina than the hand-
ful of visits by the Oklahoma haberdasher to New York in Rosenberg Bros. On the other
hand, to the extent that the business done by Cudahy under the contract had ceased,
Cannon may have believed the Court's decisions foreclosed the argument that Cudahy
was "present" in the state at the time of service. See Chipman Ltd. v. Thomas B. Jeffery
Co., 251 U.S. 373, 378-80 (1920) (holding that there was no jurisdiction over the de-
fendant when it had "removed from" the state prior to service). If Cannon did over-
estimate the ruling in Rosenberg Bros., it certainly would not be the last time the short
opinion would be asked to carry more than its own weight. See Helicopteros Naciona-
les de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984) (citing Rosenberg Bros. for the
proposition that "purchases and related trips, standing alone, are not a sufficient basis
for a State's assertion of jurisdiction" but failing to distinguish the specific jurisdiction
nature of the earlier case from the general jurisdiction inquiry on which the majority
appeared to base its decision).
See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923) (affirming a com-
pensation award to plaintiffs estate in a worker's compensation action); Frey &
Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921) (affirming the Fourth Circuit's
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Its decision to remove the action to federal court, in particular, be-
spoke a familiar strategy for litigation-savvy corporate defendants who,
like Cudahy, were sued outside of their state of incorporation or prin-
cipal place of business. In the early 1920s, during the heyday of pro-
gressive politics, the federal courts were commonly perceived to be
more favorable to business interests, and diversity jurisdiction served
as the foreign corporation's ticket into the federal courthouse. H8
Before the federal district court, Cudahy reasserted its jurisdic-
tional objections. Specifically, the company argued that the North
Carolina court lacked jurisdiction over it because Cudahy never had
been served with process and that neither Ross nor anyone else ever
had been designated as its agent for service in the state."9 While con-
ceding that its Alabama subsidiary was present and doing business in
North Carolina, Cudahy argued that because it was not and had never
been present in the state, it was not subject tojurisdiction there.
120
At the hearing before the district court, Cannon argued that the
sole question to be explored in deciding the jurisdictional issue was
whether Cannon's assertion that the separate corporate identity of the
Alabama subsidiary should be disregarded for jurisdictional purposes
was correct. 21 If the two corporations were regarded as one and the
same, even Cudahy conceded that service on the Alabama subsidiary
would then amount to effective service on the parent. 22 Thus, by the
time that the district court came to write its opinion, the central legal
issue in the case was
whether there is such an identity between the Alabama corporation and
the Maine corporation as that the Maine corporation was present
and doing business in North Carolina ... and whether, therefore, service
upon the process agent of the Alabama corporation is equivalent to
reversal of a judgment for the plaintiff under the Sherman Antitrust Act); Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U.S. 450 (1918) (finding that a Minnesota tax on in-
state property of foreign freight-line companies was not a violation of the commerce
clause); Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908) (affirming a convic-
tion for violations of the Elkin's Act, which made it unlawful to ship interstate com-
merce below set rates).
118 See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTI-
TUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 153 (2000) (noting that businesses preferred federal
courts because of their perceived corporate bias).
19 Petition to Set Aside Summons and to Dismiss at 10, Cannon Mfg. Co. v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925) (No. 255) (on file with author).
120 Id.
Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 292 F. 169, 171 (W.D.N.C. 1923).
122 Id.
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service made upon the Maine corporation, and is effective to bring the
latter within thejurisdiction of this court.
2
Cannon's decision to focus on the veil-piercing argument as the
basis forjurisdiction is particularly fascinating considering the state of
the substantive corporate law at the time. The prevailing theory
throughout the nineteenth century regarded a corporation, famously
124described as an "artificial being" by Chief Justice Marshall, as pos-
sessing an existence separate from its owners and operators. 2 5 This
entity theory of business corporations was plausibly supported in these
earlier years of our history because the only accepted form of organi-
zation, as Phillip Blumberg has observed, was a "simple corporate
structure." 26 Until the New Jersey legislature in 1888 granted permis-
sion for any corporation chartered in the state to own stock in another
corporation, neither parent-subsidiary holding companies nor other
intercorporate arrangements could exist anywhere in the nation,
12
1
except, on the rare occasions where a special charter granted a par-
ticular company the specific right to own stock in another.
28
As the old proscriptions on corporate stock ownership loosened,
new questions arose concerning public regulation of business and
legal accountability of corporate owners. One of the most important
developments in the substantive law of corporations was the recogni-
tion of a rule of limited liability for corporate shareholders.
29
This recognition, however, was slow in coming. Consensus among the
123 Id.
124 Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
125 See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing in part) (noting that the rise of the corporate mechanism was originally feared in
the nineteenth century because of concern that a corporate entity, with its "absorption
of capital" and "perpetual life," would "bring evils" such as "encroachment upon the
liberties and opportunities of the individual" and "the subjection of labor to capital").
126 BLUMBERG, supra note 19, at 3.
127 See Liggett, 288 U.S. at 556 n.32 (Brandeis, J., dissenting in part) ("New Jersey
was the first state to confer the general power of intercorporate stock holding.").
128 See William Randall Compton, Early History of Stock Ownership by Corporations, 9
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 125, 125-32 (1940) (detailing the history of stock ownership by
corporations prior to the 1888 NewJersey statute); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 520 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the evolution of holding
companies in the United States).
129 See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1.01 (2003) (noting
that while many in the early twentieth century viewed limited liability for shareholders
as extremely important, some current scholars disagree as to its significance).
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states on a default rule of limited liability for shareholders did not ex-
ist until the dawning of the twentieth century. 3 0
When the Cannon case arrived at the Court, the doctrinal bounda-
ries of limited liability for corporate shareholders were hardly settled,
and the doctrinal exceptions to the rule were still being shaped.1
3 1
One striking illustration of the developing state of corporate law is
that the now-familiar phrase, "piercing the corporate veil," the princi-
pal exception to the rule of limited liability, did not even appear in
print until Maurice Wormser's article in 1912.3 Furthermore, Profes-
sor Wormser's seminal book on the subject, Disregard of the Corporate
Fiction and Allied Corporate Problems, came out two years after the Can-
non case was decided.133  It is also notable that Judge Benjamin
Cardozo penned his famous description of the doctrine, as "envel-
oped in the mists of metaphor" in 1926, one year after the Court's de-
cision in Cannon.134 To be sure, there were a number of cases that
Cannon cited in its brief in which courts disregarded the separate
corporate form. 135 Cannon's decision to base its principal argument
for upholding service on this inchoate doctrine is particularly difficult
to explain considering that no court had ever approved using the sub-
stantive law forjurisdictional purposes.1-6
130 See Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability, 102
COLUM. L. REv. 1203, 1211 (2002) (finding that "limited corporate shareholder liabil-
ity was far from fully established until the early part of the twentieth century").
131 See Morton J. Horowitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate The-
ry, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 208 (1985) ("[T]he distinction between the liability of the
'members' of a corporation and a partnership, so clear to modem eyes, was still re-
garded rather as a matter of degree than of kind throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury.").
132 I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. REv. 496
(1912).
133 I. MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED
CORPORATE PROBLEMS 42-85 (1927).
134 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
135 See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 96, at 10 (citing In re Watertown Paper Co.,
169 F. 252, 256 (2d Cir. 1909) to show that the district court found only two exceptions
to the rule of separate corporate form). The enumerated exceptions are:
(1) The legal fiction of distinct corporate existence will be disregarded, when
necessary to circumvent fraud. (2) It may also be disregarded in a case where
a corporation is so organized and controlled, and its affairs are so conducted,
as to make it merely an instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation.
169 F. at 256.
136 The only case Cannon cited in its brief in which the separate corporate identity
was ignored for the purpose of treating service on one entity as service on another
was Alley v. Bessemer Gas Engine Co., 262 F. 94 (5th Cir. 1919). Brief of Plaintiff, supra
note 135, at 54. Yet, despite Cannon's characterization of Alley as support for the
proposition that "the doing of business by a foreign corporation in a State through a
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Ultimately, Cannon's decision to pursue this novel argument may
reflect nothing more than its belief that there were no other argu-
ments to justify the suit against Cudahy in its home forum. Unable to
demonstrate that Cudahy was doing sufficient business in North Caro-
lina tojustify service through the secretary of state, Cannon was forced
to argue that service on its subsidiary was sufficient to compel the par-
ent to appear under penalty of default.
After Cudahy raised its jurisdictional objection, the district judge
allowed the parties to conduct discovery. Cannon immediately sched-
uled depositions of two corporate representatives: John F. Gearen,Jr.,
an assistant office manager of the parent company, who was also an
officer of the subsidiary,1 37 and Frank Ross, the subsidiary's designated
agent for service. Although the record includes substantial evidence
to suggest a close corporate relationship, a review of the testimony
and corporate documents clearly reveals considerable efforts to keep
the business activities of the parent distinct from the Alabama subsidi-
ary, as well as from all of the other subsidiaries. Mr. Gearen testified,
however, that the Alabama subsidiary and Maine parent shared two
common officers. 13 Mr. Gearen himself served not only as assistant
office manager and assistant treasurer for Cudahy but also as the
assistant treasurer for the Alabama subsidiary.'39
The headquarters of the Cudahy Packing Company of Alabama
were not in Alabama at all but were located at the same address as
Cudahy's offices in Chicago, Illinois: 111 West Monroe Street.140 The
subsidiary's branch offices sent many reports to its headquarters in
subsidiary constitutes such a doing business as to make it amenable to process," id.,
the case was not as persuasive an authority as Cannon suggested. The primary issue in
Alley was not the validity of service of process but whether the defendant was absent
from the state for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations under Texas law. 262 F.
at 95. Additionally, the defendant in Alley was a Pennsylvania corporation that em-
ployed two local salesmen in Texas and apparently one of them was served with proc-
ess while in the forum. Id. at 96. By contrast, Cannon conceded that Cudahy had no
local agent in North Carolina, unless Ross was deemed to be its agent. It is not surpris-
ing that although Justice Brandeis carefully reviewed several other decisions that Can-
non cited in its brief, he apparently gave little credence to Cannon's reliance on Alley.
His handwritten memoranda to the file contains no reference to the circuit court of
appeals' decision. Memorandum by Justice Brandeis, Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy
Packing, 267 U.S. 333 (1925) (No. 255) (on file with author).
:37 Gearen Deposition, supra note 94.
138 Id. at 16-17.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 19.
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Chicago, of which at least some were mailed only to "Cudahy, 111
West Monroe Street, Chicago, Illinois."
14
Beyond these facts, however, the evidence suggested a concerted
effort by Cudahy to maintain a separate corporate identity for the
Alabama subsidiary. Especially significant in the district court's view
was the careful accounting efforts employed to treat the two as distinct
entities. 42  Moreover, the record indicated, as the district court
pointed out, that the Alabama company had been formed in 1898 and
"was not organized by or at the instance of the Maine corporation,
which was not formed until 1915." 4  After an extensive review, the
district court ultimately concluded that, for purposes of service of
process, "the Alabama corporation is a separate and distinct legal en-
tity."44
Perhaps the most intriguing portion of the district court's opinion
was the distinction it drew between an exception to corporate sepa-
rateness for substantive liability purposes and for purposes of service
of process:
If the issue I am passing upon were a question of preventing fraud
through a corporate fiction or of preventing an escape from just liability,
the court would have little trouble in holding that there is such identity
between the two corporations as to enable the court to prevent fraud;
but while the courts generally have held that they will look through cor-
porate fictions to prevent such fraud or to enforce just liability, yet I
know of no case where it has been found that a separate legal corporate
entity can have process served upon it and such process take the place of
process on some other separate legal corporate entity.'45
The district judge never explained how the evidentiary record
could appropriately support ignoring the limited liability protections
of the corporate form for substantive purposes but not for service of
process. One surmises that the court was led to its conclusion by its
view of the prevailing "power" theory of jurisdiction, which insisted
that jurisdiction required physical presence in the forum. From the
premise that the Maine and Alabama companies were "separate legal
entities" followed the logical conclusion under the then-governing
141 Id.
142 See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy, 292 F. 169, 175 (W.D.N.C. 1923) (observing
that "[under the system of bookkeeping maintained, it is absolutely possible to trace
every item which is shipped by the Maine corporation upon the order of the Alabama
corporation").
143 Id.
144 Id. at 176.
145 Id.
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territoriality principles that the latter was not present in the forum
and, therefore, not amenable to suit in the forum.46
C. Justice Brandeis's Opinion and the Legacy of Cannon
Following its dismissal of the suit, the district court certified the
question ofjurisdiction for direct appeal to the Supreme Court. This
form of direct appeal was authorized by the Evarts Act of 1891 147 and
made review of the certified question mandatory. 14  Similar to its
argument at the district court level, Cannon defended the in-state
service on the Alabama subsidiary's agent as sufficient to establish ju-. . . . . . 149
risdiction over Cudahy on a theory of vicariousjurisdiction. Cannon
again argued that substantive law principles of corporate disregard
should be incorporated into the jurisdictional analysis so as to allow
146 Id. at 177.
147 Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
148 The Evarts Act of 1891 marked two important changes in federal appellate
practice. It imposed a new, intermediate level ofjudicial review by creating the circuit
court of appeals. Id. § 2. The Evarts Act further reduced the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court by authorizing the statutory writ of certiorari, which gave the Su-
preme Court discretion to accept or decline review of intermediate circuit court of ap-
peals decisions across a wide range of cases. Id. Direct review of district court deci-
sions to the Supreme Court was still available, however, under section 5 of the Evarts
Act. Id. § 5. Among other grounds, section 5 authorized direct review "[iun any case
in which the jurisdiction of the court is in issue; in such cases the question of jurisdic-
tion alone shall be certified to the Supreme Court from the court below for decision."
Id. It was on this basis that the litigants in Cannon obtained a writ of error for direct
review by the Supreme Court, bypassing intermediate review at the circuit court of ap-
peals stage and avoiding the need for seeking discretionary review by way of certiorari.
With the district court's certification of the question of jurisdiction, the case fell
squarely within the first ground of direct appeal authorized by section 5 of the 1891
Act. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 334 (1925) (referenc-
ing section 238 of the Judicial Code of 1911, which had codified the direct appeal
grounds of section 5 from the 1891 Evarts Act and noting that "[t]he case is here un-
der [section] 238 of the Judicial Code, the question of jurisdiction having been duly
certified"); see also Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 305, 42 Stat. 837 (amending the Judicial
Code of 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, to add section 238). One other historical note
bears mentioning. The Judges' Bill of 1925, which coincidentally was passed by Con-
gress only two weeks after the oral argument in Cannon, narrowed the range of cases
for which direct review was authorized and, at the same time, expanded the Supreme
Court's discretionary review authority. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Star. 936, 938-
39 (amending Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087). If it had been applicable,
the Judges' Bill would have precluded direct review of the district court's decision in
Cannon by eliminating direct appeal by writ of error after district court certification of
a question ofjurisdiction. For a recent, general discussion of the 1891 Evarts Act and
the Judges' Bill of 1925, see Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections
Seventy-Five Years After theJudges'Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1643 (2000).
149 Cannon, 267 U.S. at 335.
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the court to attribute the forum contacts of the subsidiary, which was
present in the forum, to the parent. 15  As its brief framed the sole
question for the Court's review:
[t]he issue which developed between the parties in the court below, and
which still remains, was and is whether there was at the time of the serv-
ice of the summons such an identity between the Alabama corporation
and the defendant as that the defendant was present and doing business
in North Carolina because the Alabama corporation was present and do-
ing business there."'
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Brandeis found no basis for
treating the parent and its subsidiary as a single entity for purposes of
service of process and readily affirmed the district court's order quash-
ing service. 15' It is unclear, however, why the Court was unwilling to
attribute the forum presence of the Alabama entity to the defendant.
Justice Brandeis deserves a fair share of the blame for encouraging
misconceptions of his reasoning to flourish. His short opinion (only
four pages in the United States Reports) dispatching the plaintiffs
150 Id. Cannon advanced a second argument to the Supreme Court to support
service that it had not raised in the court below. In addition to its main argument that
service on the subsidiary was sufficient to bind the parent because the subsidiary was a
mere instrumentality or agent of the parent, Cannon also argued that the subsidiary
corporation had no legally recognized existence because Alabama law did not recog-
nize a "corporation sole." Id. at 337. In 1925, many states, including Alabama, statuto-
rily required that a corporation be owned by three or more persons. Id. A corporation
owned by less than three, a "corporation sole," offended the statutory minimum and,
according to Cannon, ceased to exist under state law. Id. Cannon cited a number of
state court decisions addressing the question of how to treat a corporation that was
owned by less than the requisite minimum number of shareholders, though, notably,
none involved the question of service of process. See Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 96, at
36-37 (citing, inter alia, First Nat'l Bank v. Winchester, 119 Ala. 168 (1898)). In his
opinion for the Court, Justice Brandeis summarily dismissed Cannon's argument that
by purporting to be a corporation sole, the subsidiary corporation ceased to exist and,
therefore, service on it amounted to service on the parent. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 337-38.
The argument's deficiency was that it was not clear under Alabama law what conse-
quences flowed from failing below the statutory minimum. Id. Brandeis held:
It may be that upon the concentration of its stock in the hands of the defen-
dant, the franchise of the Alabama corporation became subject to forfeiture
in a judicial proceeding by the State; or that thereby its status was reduced
from a corporation dejure to one defacto. But whatever might be other legal
consequences of the concentration, we cannot say that for purposes of juris-
diction, the business of the Alabama corporation in North Carolina became
the business of the defendant.
Id.
Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 96, at 3. An interesting fact about the briefing in
this case is that the defendant filed its brief before the plaintiff, even though it was the
plaintiff who was seeking to reverse the lower court's decision.
152 Cannon, 267 U.S. at 336-37.
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assignments of error has lent itself to varying interpretations. One of
the central uncertainties of the case is whether, in the Court's view,
the problem with in-state service was constitutional in nature; that is,
whether it was an infringement of Cudahy's due process rights to be
subject to the jurisdiction of a court in North Carolina. Justice Bran-
deis appeared to expressly disavow any constitutional basis in the deci-
sion. "No question of the constitutional powers of the State, or of the
federal Government, is directly presented.' 53 Yet, what could it mean
that no constitutional question was involved in the case? The answer
is certainly not self-evident, since it seems that the prevailing constitu-
tional theory of jurisdiction-the power theory-was essential to the
outcome. Lacking any agent "present" within the forum, Cudahy pre-
sumably was beyond the territorial reach of the courts in North Caro-
lina; that is, beyond what Justice Rutledge in another case would refer
to as "the utmost reach" of legislative power.154
This confusion regarding the constitutional basis, if any, for the
holding in Cannon remains a subject of much uncertainty among
lower federal and state courts. Yet, despite the divisions over the con-
tinuing vitality of the decision in Cannon, the conventional wisdom
among the lower courts today is that the Cannon Court approved the
use of veil piercing for jurisdictional purposes. 155 To be sure, the cor-
rect meaning of Cannon is a question on which courts are sharply
divided. Academic commentators have traditionally focused on the
differing interpretations of Cannon among the lower courts to mark
the boundary lines of a number of separate spheres. Which courts
continue to treat Cannon as controlling authority? Which purport to
follow Cannon, but in fact have retreated from Cannon's rigid rule?
57
Which have rejected Cannon's relevance to the constitutional inquiry
153 Id. at 336.
154 United States v. Scophony Corp. of Am., 333 U.S. 795, 804 n.13 (1948).
155 See, e.g., Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir. 1983) (cit-
ing Cannon "for the proposition that so long as a parent and subsidiary maintain sepa-
rate and distinct corporate entities, the presence of one in a forum state may not be
attributed to the other" but where the parent controls the internal business operations
and affairs of the subsidiary, jurisdiction is proper); Savage v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 147
F. Supp. 2d 86, 93 (D. Conn. 2001) (noting that the Cannon rule prohibits jurisdiction
over a parent merely because it owns a subsidiary in the forum state so long as there is
a real separation between the entities).
,56 See BLUMBERG, supra note 19, at 209 n.17 (citing courts which continue to up-
hold Cannon as controlling); see also BORN, supra note 25, at 154 (dividing cases into
similar categories).
157 See BLUMBERG, supra note 19, at 210-11 (citing cases in which courts have re-
treated from the Cannon rule); see also BORN, supra note 25, at 155 (describing various
courts' different and flexible interpretations of Cannon).
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and which have concluded that the decision has been overruled en-
tirely?158 'While it is clear that there are differences in how Cannon
is regarded, these differences obscure a less apparent point about the
lower court decisions in this area. That is, if we look past the surface
disagreements over whether Cannon remains good law, we will dis-
cover that these apparent differences mask a fundamental consensus
over the exercise of indirect jurisdiction as a measure of state court
power. Put another way, focusing on the differences among courts
over whether or to what extent Cannon remains controlling authority
misses a larger truth: that the predominant view among courts is that
veil-piercing law may be invoked to justify indirect exercises of state
court power.
For example, Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp.,159 the leading Fifth Cir-
cuit case on jurisdictional veil-piercing, is illustrative of those decisions
that continue to cite Cannon approvingly and thereby continue to ac-
cept the validity of using veil-piercing for jurisdictional purposes.
Nicolet, Inc., the named defendant in Hargrave, acquired some manu-
facturing facilities and other assets of a Pennsylvania asbestos com-
pany, Keasbey & Mattison Co., in 1962."6° Soon after the asset acquisi-
tion, Keasbey & Mattison formally dissolved.' After two different
asbestos lawsuits (consolidated by the court as the Hargrave action),
Nicolet filed third-party complaints against Keasbey & Mattison's
corporate parent, Turner & Newall, Ltd. (T & N), a publicly traded
English company headquartered in Manchester, England. Prior to
Nicolet's purchase of the manufacturing facilities, T & N had been
162sole corporate parent of Keasbey & Mattison.
Among other grounds for dismissal of the impleader action,
T & N challenged the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it as unau-
thorized by the terms of Texas's long-arm statute and as constitution-
ally excessive. 163 Although Nicolet subsequently sought to assert (too
late, however, for the Fifth Circuit to consider the argument) that T &
N had sufficient direct contacts with Texas, the central ground upon
which the court maintained exercise of'jurisdiction was "not upon the
direct contacts of T & N eo nomine, but rather upon T & N's doing of
158 See BLUMBERG, supra note 19, at 209 (citing cases in which courts have rejected
the Cannon rule); see also BORN, supra note 25, at 155 (citing different approaches to
interpreting Cannon).
159 710 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1983).
160 Id. at 1156.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 1157.
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business in Texas by and through its subservient captive subsidiary,
the Keasbey-Mattison Company., 164 The court then framed the juris-
dictional inquiry as two parts: Nicolet must first show that Keasbey &
Mattison was subject to jurisdiction in Texas; and then, having estab-
lished sufficient contacts, it must demonstrate that they should be im-
puted to T & N.
16 5
The Fifth Circuit began its jurisdictional analysis by emphasizing
the statutory nature of the initial inquiry; it would only be necessary,
the court said, to reach the constitutional due process question after
establishing T & N's amenability to service under the state long-arm
statute. 166 This aspect of the court's decision, by itself, makes the case
worth studying closely. The decision to focus the jurisdictional analy-
sis first on the defendant's statutory amenability is certainly curious,
given that both state and federal courts interpreted the Texas long-
arm statute to extend as far as the limits of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment.16 Normally, linking the long-arm statute to
the constitutional maximum is thought to collapse the question of leg-
islative intent into the International Shoe test. Why, then, did the court
bother with assessing the statutory predicate? The explanation per-
tains to the nature of the plaintiffs' jurisdictional allegations.
Earlier circuit decisions that suggested the necessity of requiring
the plaintiff to prove a statutory basis in indirect jurisdiction cases,
even though the state long-arm had been interpreted to go to the
full extent of due process, drove the court's focus on T & N's amena-
bility to service under state law. 168 The rationale of these cases was that
because of the unique nature of a vicarious jurisdiction assertion, the
jurisdictional nexus depended upon an underlying substantive
164 Id. at 1159 n.3.
165 Id. at 1159.
166 Id. The court stated that:
In deciding whether the state jurisdictional statute confers jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant in a diversity suit, it must be determined that (1) the
defendant is in fact amenable to service under the statute (state law of the fo-
rum controls this question), and (2) if the state statute has been complied
with, then federal law must be applied to determine whether assertion of ju-
risdiction over the defendant comports with due process.
Id. at 1158-59 (quoting Walker v. Newgent, 583 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1978)).
167 See id. at 1161 n.4 (noting that both state and federal courts had pronounced
the Texas long-arm statute to authorize the assertion of personal jurisdiction over non-
residents to the limits of the due process clause).
168 See, e.g., Prod. Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 491-92 (5th Cir.
1974) (recognizing that Texas's long-arm statute was intended to reach the limits of
federal due process requirements but nonetheless requiring a prima facie showing of
facts upon which jurisdiction is statutorily based).
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allegation and the plaintiffs burden was to offer at least prima facie
evidence of the underlying principal-agent relationship to come
within the terms of the long-arm statute.
69
One of the great ironies of the decision in Hargrave, however, is
that despite the seemingly careful attention paid to the language of
the long-arm, the court nonetheless proceeded to measure T & N's
statutory amenability to service by citing Cannon and its progeny, ap-
parently blind to the irrelevance of these federal cases to deciphering
the meaning of the state long-arm statute.170 In this regard, Hargrave
illustrates a common failure among courts to recognize the source-of-
law issue implicated in the evaluation of many vicarious jurisdiction
arguments. 7'
169 Id. at 492. Relatedly, there is disagreement among the courts on whether the
fiduciary shield doctrine, which provides that corporate officers are not amenable to
suit in a forum if their actions are taken on behalf of the corporation, is a limitation on
the reach of a forum's long-arm statute or on federal due process analysis. Compare
Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 902 n.3 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The fidu-
ciary shield doctrine is not a constitutional principle, but is rather a doctrine based on
judicial inference as to the intended scope of the long-arm statute."), with Saktides v.
Cooper, 742 F. Supp. 382, 385 (W.D. Tex. 1990) ("[T]he fiduciary shield doctrine [is]
an important sub-issue under a due process analysis."). The Supreme Court did not
have to address the proper place for the fiduciary shield doctrine in the law of per-
sonal jurisdiction in its decision in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), because the
California statute expressly extended to the due process limit. Id. at 786 n.5. If, how-
ever, the state long-arm statute enumerates specific kinds of conduct that trigger juris-
dictional amenability, analysis of the fiduciary shield doctrine implicates an a priori
choice of law determination. In analysis of the fiduciary shield doctrine, the court in
Auto Wax Co. v. Marchese, No. 3:01-CV-2571-M, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12758 (N.D. Tex.,
July 15, 2002), wrote:
If the fiduciary shield doctrine operates as a limitation on a state's long-arm
statute, then the fiduciary shield law of that state's courts should be applied.
In contrast, if the fiduciary shield doctrine finds its basis in federal due proc-
ess analysis, the Court should look to federal common law relating to the doc-
trine.
Id. at *8-9.
170 See Hargrave v. Fibreboard, 710 F.2d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that
"Cannon... stands for the proposition that so long as a parent and subsidiary maintain
separate and distinct corporate entities, the presence of one in a forum state may not
be attributed to the other").
171 See, e.g., De Castro v. Sanifill, Inc., 198 F.3d 282, 283-85 (1st Cir. 1999) (failing
to identify whether the statutory or constitutional portion of the jurisdictional inquiry
was at issue); Flip Side Prods., Inc. v.Jam Prods., Ltd., No. 82 C 3684, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15411, at * 13 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 1990) (upholding service on agent of affiliated
entity and observing that "[i]t makes little sense to insist on separate service of indi-
viduals and corporations that are held as a matter of law to be alter egos of another
corporation"); see also United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 561 F. Supp. 354, 361 (C.D.
Cal. 1983) (finding service of process requirements satisfied after more exhaustive ju-
risdictional analysis); BLUMBERG, supra note 19, at 209 (observing that "in some cases,
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Seemingly unconcerned that Justice Brandeis's decision bore no
weight on the question of the Texas legislature's intent in its long-arm
statute, the Hargrave court began its substantive analysis ofjurisdiction
by quoting a key finding and passage from the Court's opinion in
Cannon regarding the relationship between the parent and subsidiary
in that case: "[T]he corporate separation, though perhaps merely
formal, was real. It was not pure fiction."
172
After highlighting this vital language, the court in Hargrave con-
cluded that Cannon "stands for the proposition that so long as a par-
ent and subsidiary maintain separate and distinct corporate entities,
the presence of one in a forum state may not be attributed to the
other., 173 Even though Cannon required that this initial presumption
of corporate separateness be honored, Hargrave quickly cautions that
the case does not mandate that courts apply the presumption inflexi-
bly:
It has long been recognized, however, that in some circumstances a close
relationship between a parent and its subsidiary mayjustify a finding that
the parent "does business" in a jurisdiction through the local activities of
its subsidiaries.... The rationale for such an exercise of jurisdiction is
that the parent corporation exerts such domination and control over its
subsidiary that "that they do not in reality constitute separate and dis-
tinct corporate entities but are one and the same corporation for pur-
poses ofjurisdiction.",
74
it is not entirely clear whether the court is discussing amenability to service (jurisdic-
tion) or the validity of service of process").
172 Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1160 (quoting Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
267 U.S. 333, 337 (1925) (alteration in original)). This passage from Cannon is cited
with great frequency by other courts as well. See, e.g., Richard v. Bell Ad. Corp., 946 F.
Supp. 54, 69 (D.D.C. 1996) (quoting the passage and ultimately concluding that "[a]s
in Cannon, the plaintiffs herein have made no showing that the corporate separation
between [the defendant parent corporation] and its subsidiaries is 'pure fiction"').
Courts cite the passage from Cannon not only in the context of measuring judicial ju-
risdiction, but also in the context of assessing diversity for subject matter jurisdiction
purposes. In Schwartz v. Electronic Data Systems, Inc., 913 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1990), the
court cited the Cannon passage and observed that:
[T]he principle enunciated there should be applied in any case where federal
court jurisdiction depends on the relationship between a corporate parent
and its corporate subsidiary. That principle is: When formal separation is
maintained between a corporate parent and its corporate subsidiary, federal
court jurisdiction over the subsidiary is determined by that corporation's citi-
zenship, not the citizenship of the parent. So far as we can determine, every
court of appeals that has considered the question has reached this conclusion.
Id. at 283.
173 Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1160.
174 Id. at 1159 (citation omitted).
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In reading Cannon as both endorsing formalism and approving a
necessary exception to such formalism, Hargrave adopted an interpre-
tation of Justice Brandeis's decision that had been widely followed by
courts in other circuits as well. The most commonly applied excep-
tion to respecting the separate incorporation of affiliated entities is
when evidence exists that undue control by one of its members has
been exerted1
76
The question of control, however, has been applied inconsistently
by the courts. I will take up the important question of control and its
relevance to rethinking the use of veil piercing in the jurisdictional
test, but for now, it is enough to note that Hargrave and its acceptance
of the use of veil piercing for jurisdictional purposes remains the law
of the circuit. 177
In apparent contrast to Hargrave and other cases that continue
to accept Cannon as good law, other courts regard Cannon as having
no applicability in the modem jurisdictional era."" Some have
concluded, more broadly, that the decision has been entirely and di-
rectly overruled by the Court's subsequent decisions.1 79 A later case
frequently cited by the lower courts as directly overruling Cannon is
175 See BLUMBERG, supra note 19, at 58 (observing that "[m]ost of the federal
courts considering questions ofjurisdiction with respect to parent and subsidiary cor-
porations have continued to apply the Cannon doctrine") and authorities cited therein.
See id. at 60-62 (discussing how courts have distorted Cannon into a test consid-
ering participation in day-to-day operations).
177 See, e.g., Dickson Marine Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 339 (5th Cir.
1999) (applying the Hargrave test).
178 See BLUMBERG, supra note 19, at 66-73 (discussing those cases rejecting Can-
non). For instance, in the leading case in the Sixth Circuit, Velandra v. Regie Nationale
Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 1964), the Court noted that:
[T]he ruling of the Cannon case, if not qualified by the subsequent ruling in
the International Shoe Company case, has been at least qualified in later cases
holding foreign corporations amenable to the personal jurisdiction of local
courts because of the local activities of subsidiary corporations upon the the-
ory that the corporate separation is fictitious, or that the parent has held the
subsidiary out as its agent, or, more vaguely, that the parent has exercised an
undue degree of control over the subsidiary.
Id.
179 See, e.g., Meredith v. Health Care Prods., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 923, 926 (D. Wyo.
1991) (noting that "[b]ecause the jurisdictional question requires the balancing of
many factors, the formal separation of corporate entities does not alone raise a bar to
the court exercising jurisdiction"); Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F. Supp.
1412, 1419 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (stating that "[i]n light of [cases following Cannon], reli-
ance on the rule of Cannon and on alter ego principles of corporation law to deter-
mine a nonresident's 'presence' is no longer relevant to ... jurisdiction"); Superior
Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle, A.G., 83 F.R.D. 414, 421 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (remarking that "[t]he
substance, not form, of the inter-corporate nexus will be dispositive").
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United States v. Scophony Corp.'80 The question in Scophony was whether
a British corporation was amenable to service of process in a federal
district court for antitrust violations under §§ 1 & 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act"" and § 12 of the Clayton Act.18 2 Under § 12, a corpora-
tion could be served with process in any judicial district in which it is
an inhabitant or where "it may be found. "0 81 Additionally, venue was
proper in any district where "it may be found or transacts business."84
Scophony, the British manufacturer, had organized American
Scophony as a wholly owned subsidiary to promote its products in the
United States. In holding that the British parent was "found" in the
judicial district within the meaning of § 12 and thus amenable to suit
in the federal court in which the action was filed, the Court distin-
guished cases involving "manufacturing and selling companies," cit-
ing, inter alia, Cannon.'8 5 Justice John Rutledge wrote for the majority
that there was "no such situation as was presented in the manufactur-
ing and selling cases on which appellee lies.' '186 He suggested further
that the "pulverizing approach" of cases like Cannon failed to recog-
nize the actual business "enterprise" in which parent and subsidiary
corporations often operate.
I7
Such a continuing and far-reaching enterprise is not to be governed in
this respect by rules evolved with reference to the very different busi-
nesses and activities of manufacturing and selling. Nor, what comes to
the same thing, is the determination to be made for such an enterprise
by atomizing it into minute parts or events, in disregard of the actual
unity and continuity of the whole course of conduct, by the process
sometimes applied in borderline cases involving manufacturing and sell-
ing activities.
A number of courts and commentators have regarded Scophony
as a rejection of Brandeis's "atomizing" decision. 8 9 It is well worth
180 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
181 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
:82 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 (2000); see also Scophony, 333 U.S. at 796.
83 333 U.S. at 796 n.1 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 12).
184 Id.
185 Id. at 812-14, 813 n.23.
186 Id. at 816.
187 Id. at 817.
188 Id.
189 See, e.g., B.J. Semel Assocs. v. United Fireworks Mfg., 355 F.2d 827, 832 n.7
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (criticizing the court's reasoning in Intermountain Ford Tractor Sales
Co. v. Massey-Ferguson Ltd., 210 F. Supp. 930 (D. Utah 1962), but noting that the
opinion suggested that Cannon "should be broadly viewed in light of what the Supreme
Court had later said in Scophony about the liberalized scope of Section 12"); Phone
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noting, however, that rejecting Cannon means different things to dif-
ferent people. Blumberg treats Scophony as affirmation that the courts
should not be tied to a "formalist" treatment ofjurisdictional inquiries
and as disapproving of the "entity" theory of corporate law insofar as it
ignores "economic realities."'1 90
Some courts have followed Blumberg insofar as they have de-
parted from the traditional understanding of Cannon and rejected in
toto the use of veil-piercing law as a predicate for an indirect jurisdic-
tional outcome. In Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co.,' 9' for
example, Chief Judge Theis carefully analyzed the plaintiff's veil-
piercing argument and, after considering the historical evolution of
the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence on the law of per-
sonal jurisdiction, concluded that veil-piercing doctrine should play
no role under modern jurisdictional doctrine:
Propriety of piercing the corporate veil rests upon an analysis of corpo-
rate law factors. The constitutional propriety of the exercise ofjurisdic-
tion rests upon a balancing of the different considerations noted above.
The results obviously are not necessarily consistent.
Concededly, a corporation's relationship with an affiliated corpora-
tion in the forum is relevant to the due process question in a manner
different from that in which it pertains to the corporate law question of
alter ego relationships and "veil-piercing."1 9
The court ultimately concluded that even without resort to veil-
piercing doctrine, the plaintiff had made a sufficient showing of the
defendant's amenability to suit to uphold the exercise of jurisdic-
Lion.193
Unfortunately, other courts have concluded that Cannon was re-
jected only insofar as it applied a formalistic test to determine when
Directorics Co. v. Contcl Corp., 786 F. Supp. 930, 939 (D. Utah 1992) ("In Scophony,
the Supreme Court expressly declined to apply [Cannon] in defining the language of
the service of process provision of § 12."); BLUMBERG, supra note 19, at 176-78 (discuss-
ing courts' increasing rejection of Cannon in light of Scophony and interpreting Scophony
as "rject[ing] the fragmentation approach to formalism").
BLUMBERG, supra note 19, at 47, 176-78.
191 460 F. Supp. 483 (D. Kan. 1978).
192 Id. at 507.
193 Id. at 512-15. The court found that the subsidiary, Superior Overseas, "by itself
[fell] within the ambit of subsection (b) (5)" of the Kansas long-arm statute, insofar as
"Superior Overseas [had] entered into a contract which [called] for partial perform-
ance by both parties in the state" and that the exercise of jurisdiction satisfied "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 512.
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the substantive law may be employed for jurisdictional purposes.194
Those who read Cannon's demise in this fashion continue to regard
the premise of vicarious jurisdiction as acceptable. The underlying
assumption is that once Cannon's formalism is set aside, the courts
may consider the use of substantive law to pierce through the fiction
of corporate separateness. Even some courts that purport to follow
Chief Judge Theis's careful reasoning in Energy Reserves nonetheless
continue to measure jurisdiction through consideration of veil-
piercing assertions. 195
In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc.'196 is another case rejecting the
precise holding of Cannon as no longer good law, yet continuing to
measure the constitutional propriety of indirectly exercising jurisdic-
tion by attributing the forum contacts of separately-incorporated sub-
sidiaries to the absent corporate parents. In In re Telectronics, Judge S.
Arthur Spiegel cited the Sixth Circuit's decision in Velandra'97 for the
proposition that "formalistic application of the alter ego doctrine
under Cannon was displaced by International Shoe."'98 Thus, the fun-
damental problem with Cannon was that its "presumption of form over
substance [was] out-of-step with the modern approach to personal ju-
risdiction."1 9
Encouragingly, the court seemed to dismiss the plaintiffs attempt
to base jurisdiction on the use of alter ego principles.0 ° Yet, having
194 See, e.g., DeCastro v. Sanifill, Inc., 198 F.3d 282, 283-84 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[T]o
establish jurisdiction over the parent, a part)' must produce 'strong and robust' evi-
dence of control by the parent company over the subsidiary, rendering the latter a
'mere shell."'); Indian Coffee Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 482 F. Supp. 1098, 1104
(W.D. Pa. 1980) (using Cannon as controlling precedent in dismissing claim against the
parent company for a subsidiary's alleged antitrust violation), affd, 752 F.2d 891 (3d
Cir. 1985); In re Chicken Antitrust Litig., 407 F. Supp. 1285, 1294 (N.D. Ga. 1975)
("Where the subsidiary maintains its separate entity and carries in its activities without
having its daily business affairs controlled by the parent.., the subsidiary will not ren-
der the parent corporation transacting business in the district .. "); see also infra text
accompanying notes 195-205 (discussing cases that have rejected Cannon's formalism
but continue to use the substantive law of veil piercing to measure the constitutional
limits of state court power).
195 See, e.g., Hoffman v. United Telecomms., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1463, 1470-76 (D.
Kan. 1983) (using the parent-subsidiary relationship and the extent of control the par-
ent exercised over the subsidiary as determinative of whether there were minimum
contacts with the forum).
196 953 F. Supp. 909 (S.D. Ohio 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 221 F.3d 870 (6th Cir.
2000).
197 Velandra v. Regie Nationale des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1964).
198 953 F. Supp. at 916 (citing Velandra, 336 F.2d at 297).
199 Id. at 918.
200 Id. at 915. The court cited Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F.
Supp. 483 (D. Kan. 1978), and noted that "[t]he formalistic approach of the alter ego
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noted that the substantive law of alter ego was crafted with different
purposes in mind than the assessment of personal jurisdiction, the
court proceeded to cite Brilmayer and Paisley's California Law Review
article 21 as the basis for examining whether there was either a basis for
"attributing" the subsidiary's contacts to the parent or for "merging"
the parent and subsidiary into a single entity for jurisdictional pur-
202poses. Ultimately, Judge Spiegel concluded that there were suffi-
cient facts presented to "create an inference 'that the absent parent
and the subsidiary are in fact a single legal entity,' at least for the pur-
poses of exercising jurisdiction."2 3 What facts allowed the judge to in-
fer that a merger existed? Essentially, the inference turned on the
degree of "day-to-day" control that the absent defendants possessed
204over subsidiaries with forum connections. Left unexplained, how-
ever, was why it was necessary to merge these entities to create an
"inference" that they were "a single legal entity" for jurisdictional pur-
poses, rather than merely regarding the same evidence as demonstrat-
ing sufficient direct connections between the nonresident defendants
and the forum. In this latter regard, In re Telectronics again reflects
how "control" is used to support attributive jurisdictional theory and
not as a measure of a defendant's direct involvement in the forum-
related activities leading to the dispute. Even if the court reached the
right result, its analytical emphasis on "merger" has lent confusion to
the case law in the Sixth Circuit including, rather remarkably, its own
later opinion as to the jurisdictional amenability of the same parent
companies to be bound to a proposed class settlement.20
5
In sum, even where Cannon has been rejected as inapplicable to
the constitutional inquiry or otherwise rendered obsolete by more re-
cent decisions, veil piercing is still used to measure the constitutional
limits of state court power. Framed in this light, subsequent cases may
doctrine ... is irrelevant to the question whether the exercise of jurisdiction over an
absent parent corporation would violate the Due Process Clause." Id.201
Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 31.
202 In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 953 F. Supp. at 918.
203 Id. at 921 (quoting Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 31, at 12).
204 Id. The Court noted, inter alia, that parent company "officials participated in
the day-to-day operations of the [subsidiary] Telectronics Companies" and that
"[c]ollectively, Defendants often treated these institutions as one entity for internal
and external purposes." Id.
205 See Beckert v. TPLC Holdings, Inc. (In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc.), 221
F.3d 870, 878-80 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing Judge Spiegel's order approving a settle-
ment that excluded Australian parent companies over which the court "was unlikely to
obtain jurisdiction," noting that the decision "appears to contradict the court's finding
in its earlier order denying the Australian defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction").
AGAINST VICARIOUS JURISDICTION
have eclipsed Cannon's formalism or the precise doctrinal underpin-
nings of the case, but the basic assumption that state court power may
be measured vicariously through reliance on the substantive law of veil
piercing remains largely unchallenged.
D. Reconsidering the Canon of Cannon
As we have just seen, according to conventional wisdom the
Court's decision in Cannon approves the use of veil piercing for juris-
dictional purposes. However inviting, this conventional view of the
case does not withstand closer scrutiny. Legal historian Edward Pur-
cell has noted that time and distance lead scholars and judges to dis-
tort the intended meaning of a case, as the historical context in which
the legal issues were argued and the decision was reached is lost. 0 6 If
the historical evidence is gathered and carefully considered, however,
the mainstream interpretation of Cannon as broad support for the
model of vicarious jurisdiction must be questioned.
1. Difficulties with the Conventional View of Cannon
The first problem with the conventional view of Brandeis's opin-
ion in Cannon is that it cannot be squared with the Justice's ardent
207opposition to the regime in Swift v. Tyson. In drawing a distinction
between real and fictitious corporate separations in Cannon, Brandeis
failed to cite any state law authorities to explain why one corporate
group should be treated as being comprised of separate entities while
related but separately incorporated entities should be regarded as a
single juridical unit. Thus, his conclusion that the corporate sepa-
rateness of Cudahy and its subsidiary should be respected seems to be
based on natural and self-evident principles of justice, a kind of gen-
eral federal common law still permissible in the years before Erie Rail-
road v. Tompkins. °8 If the standard interpretation of Brandeis's opin-
ion as approving the use of substantive law to reach indirect
jurisdictional outcomes is correct, then this raises one of the most in-
triguing mysteries about the Cannon case: Why would Brandeis, of all
people, have written an opinion that relies so centrally on general
federal common law?
206 PURCELL, supra note 34, at 4-6.
207 41 U.S. 1 (1842) (holding that in diversity cases, federal courts are bound only
by state statutes and interpretations of statutes and are otherwise free to develop and
apply their own common law rules), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
208 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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The question is more vexing still if one considers that the Cannon
case embodied so much of what Brandeis vehemently decried about
the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts and the attendant con-
sequences of the Swift rule. Here was a battle between unequal par-
ties-Cudahy was a corporate behemoth that conducted business on
both a national and international scale; that was no stranger to litiga-
tion in the federal courts and even the Supreme Court; that fre-
quently invoked diversity jurisdiction to seek what it viewed as a safer,
usually corporate-friendly forum. Long before Erie, Brandeis had ex-
pressed disdain for rules which permitted corporate defendants to
abuse the judicial process in this manner.0 9 Why would Brandeis have
gone out of his way, as the conventional view must assume, to justify
Cudahy's dismissal by relying on an articulation of general federal
common law?
One answer, perhaps, is that Brandeis may have felt that Cannon
was not the right case for making the argument against the rule in
Swift. Thirteen years before the decision in Erie, the regime in Swift
v. Tyson was predominant. Indeed, in other decisions before 1938,
Brandeis (and Holmes) concurred in the Court's decisions approving
federal common law.2' °  Even if Brandeis was already opposed to
the Swi rule in 1925, and we know he was, he nonetheless may not
yet have been ready to mount an attack on the established precedent.
He may simply have preferred to keep his powder dry to fight another
day. Yet, while the Cannon case may not have been the occasion for
overturning Swift, and while Brandeis's failure to cite any state
authorities can be recognized as quite unexceptional for the era, it
seems doubtful that he would have gone out of his way to write an
opinion that depended so centrally on a general federal common law
standard of veil piercing forjurisdictional purposes.
There is another explanation for this apparent contradiction be-
tween Brandeis's decision in Cannon and his opposition to the rule
in Swift, but it requires that we rethink some basic assumptions about
the case. Conventional wisdom accepts the premise that Brandeis
approved of the incorporation of general federal common law to sup-
port a model of vicarious jurisdiction and then seeks an explanation
to square Cannon with his disapproval of Swift. If, however, we start
by reexamining this premise, the apparent contradiction with his
209 See PURCELL, supra note 34, at 143 (describing Brandeis's "[p] rogressive hostil-
ity toward large corporations on the grounds that they exploited the availability of di-
versitjurisdiction").
2 Id. at 117-40.
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opposition to the rule in Swift is more easily reconciled. A more per-
suasive explanation for Brandeis's failure to cite state authorities in
Cannon is that the accepted wisdom about the case is wrong. In up-
holding the district court's order, Brandeis did not endorse reliance
on any substantive common law rule-state or federal-to determine
whether attribution of the contacts of one person or entity to another
should be permitted absent legislative authorization of veil-piercing
law forjurisdictional purposes.
Let us return to the text of the Cannon opinion itself and consider
it alongside the arguments advanced by the parties in their briefs to
the Court. Brandeis followed Cudahy's argument against using sub-
stantive law to disregard the corporate form for jurisdictional pur-
poses. He also correspondingly rejected Cannon's central argument
that the Court should use corporate disregard doctrine to treat the
two corporations as a single entity. Cannon cited a number of deci-
sions in support of its view that the corporate separateness of the par-
ent and subsidiary should be ignored for assessing the validity of serv-
ice of process. In these cases the limited liability protections of the
211corporate form were disregarded for substantive purposes. By com-
parison, Cudahy argued in its Supreme Court brief that these authori-
ties were inapposite because they all involved issues of substantive
law.212 The issue, Cudahy observed, was service of process, not sub-
stantive liability:
There have been many cases recently decided by the courts in which in
dealing with parties properly brought before their jurisdiction they have
treated subsidiary corporations as one with the parent corporation when
this action was necessary to do substantial justice. Certain of these cases
were cited by plaintiff in its brief filed in the court below, but all are ab-
solutely no authority for the contention that for purposes of acquiring
jurisdiction-particularly when it is not necessary to do justice-the courts
will disregard the separate entity of either corporation."'~
It may be recalled that the distinction between use of corporate
disregard doctrine for substantive rather than for jurisdictional ends
211 See Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 96, at 43-54 (presenting cases to illustrate that
"[e]very time courts come into contact with a corporation which is 'merely an instru-
mentality or adjunct of another corporation' they disregard it and deal with the real
owner").
See Brief of Defendant in Error, at 42-47, Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925) (No. 255) (on file with author).
213 Id. at 42.
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also was endorsed by the district court in its decision quashing service
214
on Cudahy.
In his opinion for the Court, Brandeis followed both the district
court and the defendant in rejecting a similar attempt to use substan-
tive legal rules for jurisdictional purposes: "There is here no attempt
to hold the defendant liable for an act or omission of its subsidiary or
to enforce as against the latter a liability of the defendant. Hence,
cases concerning substantive ights... have no application."2 15 In
other words, the question was service of process, not substantive liabil-
ity. From this perspective, service on Ross was ineffective in Cannon
not because the plaintiff made an insufficient showing that the sepa-
rate corporate identities of Cudahy and its subsidiary should be
merged. Service was ineffective because showing merger could never
be sufficient to demonstrate jurisdiction where the service of process
statute did not expressly authorize using corporate disregard doctrine
to justify in-state service on the absent parent.
A second difficulty with the conventional view of Cannon is that it
conflicts with the evidentiary record of the internal court discussions
culled from Brandeis's case files. In 1925, it was a novel notion, to say
the least, that federal courts could invoke the substantive doctrine of
corporate disregard to support in-state service on an entity affiliated
with a defendant not present in the forum. Neither the Supreme
Court nor any lower federal or state court had approved such a prac-
tice. This is hardly surprising given the primitive state of corporate
disregard doctrine. One would expect, then, that if Brandeis had in-
tended to revolutionize the law ofjurisdiction by linking the validity of
in-state service to an application of the undeveloped substantive law of
veil piercing, the effort would have met with considerable discussion
and debate among the justices on the nation's highest court. Quite to
the contrary, however, evidence of the internal court discussions of
the case reveals remarkable agreement among the members about
how the case should be decided. None of the Justices appears to have
thought that Brandeis's opinion altered the law of jurisdiction to any
significant degree. Although one certainly should be cautious about
forming any conclusions based on this information alone, it is consis-
tent with other available evidence and thus is further support for re-
jecting the conventional interpretation of Cannon.
214 Supra text accompanying notes 142-46.
215 Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 337 (1925) (internal
citations omitted).
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Chief Justice William Howard Taft assigned the task of drafting
the Cannon opinion to Brandeis. There is no record or account of the
Justices' initial discussion and views of the case, but it appears that
there was an early general consensus about how the case should be
disposed. It was little more than a month from the time the case was
argued on January 28, 1925 that the Court announced its March 2 de-
216cision l. For any court, that would be a very short turnaround time in
which to announce a decision on the merits; indeed, as compared
with decisions in other cases during the October 1924 term, Cannon
was decided (and the opinion completed) very rapidly.2 7
Additionally, apparently none of Brandeis's brethren had any
fundamental objections to the draft opinion he circulated. 218  All
signed off on the version Brandeis sent to them, indicating their con-
currence in notes they returned to him.219 Several of the Justices of-
fered suggestions for improvements, although these were mostly stylis-
tic in nature; in fact, only the proposed changes from McReynolds can
be characterized as substantive. McReynolds's suggestion was to mod-
ify a sentence that would turn out to be central to the opinion: Bran-
deis's statement that "[t]he corporate separation, though perhaps
merely formal, was real."220 McReynolds proposed deleting the quali-
fying phrase "though perhaps merely formal." 22' The sentence itself
had not been included in the original draft Brandeis composed,
216 Cannon, 267 U.S. at 333.
217 Cf., e.g., Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 87 (1925) (announcing a unanimous
decision on the same day as Cannon, though oral argument had occurred approxi-
mately three months earlier, on December 1, 1924).
218 Memorandum of Justice Louis Brandeis, Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925) (No. 255) (on file with author). This undated draft opinion
is contained in the Papers of Louis D. Brandeis, Special Collections of the Harvard Law
School Library and is also available through the Indiana University School of Law Li-
bra r~'.
Memoranda from Justices William Howard Taft, Pierce Butler, Willis Van
Devanter, Edward Sanford, Oliver Wendell Holmes, James McReynolds, and George
Sutherland to Justice Louis Brandeis, Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267
U.S. 333 (1925) (No. 255) (on file with author). Holmes wrote that it was "a sound
and excellent decision." Id. The decision in Cannon was 8-0. Justice McKenna had
retired from the Court on January 5, 1925, after Taft successfully prevailed upon him
to do so and thus did not even participate in oral argument. See DavidJ. Garrow, Men-
tal Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U.
CHI. L. REv. 995, 1014-16 (2000) (describing McKenna's forced retirement from
Court). Harlan Stone took McKenna's place on the Court in March 1925.
20 Cannon, 267 U.S. at 337.
221 See Memorandum fromJustice McReynolds, supra note 219, at 3.
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although precisely when it was added cannot be ascertained as the
drafts in the file are all undated.22
In the proceeding draft, the key sentences appear in handwriting
in the margin of the paper. They, along with several other changes,
were later typeset and the draft was circulated to the other Justices for
review and comment. In any event, by the time Brandeis circulated
his final draft to the other Justices, the sentence was included. One
can only guess what prompted McReynolds's suggested revision. He
may very well have believed Brandeis's characterization of the corpo-
rate separation between Cudahy and its Alabama subsidiary as both
"real" and "merely formal" was an awkward-and perhaps unten-
able-conception. Whatever the explanation, he apparently over-
came any lingering concerns, as neither this suggestion nor any of the
more minor revisions proposed by the other justices in their return
notes were adopted. The draft Brandeis circulated was adopted un-
changed as the final opinion of the Court.
The easy consensus that the Justices reached in Cannon cannot be
squared with the view that the Court approved an entirely new model
of vicarious jurisdiction. To believe that the Court would have
adopted a revolutionary jurisdictional framework without any discus-
sion seems highly implausible. Moreover, any suggestion that the case
did not break new jurisdictional ground, because the actual holding
was to deny jurisdiction, hardly provides much of a responsive expla-
nation. Supporters of vicarious jurisdiction claim that a general rule
may be derived from the case-despite its precise holding-approving
223the use of veil piercing forjurisdictional purposes.
2. Rereading Cannon
If the Court in Cannon did not sanction using substantive law to
determine that the corporate veil of Cudahy's subsidiary should be re-
spected for jurisdictional purposes, then on what basis did the Court
conclude that in-state service of process could not compel Cudahy's
appearance in the forum? The answer may be found by building on
the historical evidence gathered and by rereading the text of the
222 Although we cannot fix the precise date that changes were made, it is possible
to trace the content of the draft that immediately preceded the version circulated to
the otherjustices. After citing the Conley, Peterson, and Peoples Tobacco cases, the original
draft read: "The fact that, in the case at bar, the identity of interest may have been
more complete, and the exercise of control over the subsidiary may have been more
intimate are, in the absence of an applicable statute, not of legal significance." Memo-
randum ofJustice Brandeis, supra note 218, at 2.
223 See BLUMBERG, supra note 19, at 74-76.
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opinion itself. If the objection tojurisdiction was not constitutional in
scope, then it must be that the attempted service was ineffective for
some other reason. In Cannon, that other reason was a defect in
service that arose prior to the constitutional inquiry; namely, that no
statutory basis for service on the subsidiary had been demonstrated:
The claim thatjurisdiction exists is not rested upon the provisions of any
state statute or upon any local practice dealing with the subject.
... Congress has not provided that a corporation of one State shall be
amenable to suit in the federal court for another State in which the
plaintiff resides, whenever it employs a subsidiary corporation as the in-
strumentality for doing business therein."4
What about the evidence the plaintiff advanced of the close rela-
tionship between parent and subsidiary and the cases it cited whereby
the separate corporate identity could be ignored for substantive pur-
poses?22
5 Brandeis dismissed this argument with dispatch: "In the
case at bar, the identity of interest may have been more complete and
the exercise of control over the subsidiary more intimate than in the
three cases cited [by the plaintiff], but that fact has, in the absence of
an applicable statute, no legal significance. ' '2 6 Substantive law was
crafted with different ends in mind, Brandeis said explicitly, and can-
not readily be borrowed tojustify in-state service on an affiliated entity
227where no enabling legislation authorizes service on this basis.
The key, then, to understanding the decision in Cannon is to keep
two related points in mind. First, as described above, the decision not
to exercise jurisdiction in Cannon was made on statutory, not constitu-
tional grounds. Second, by affirming the quashing of service, Bran-
deis also rejected the effort to base the exercise of jurisdiction on
the law of substantive veil piercing. While a number of courts and
commentators have concluded correctly that the problem in Cannon
was statutory, not constitutional, 28 most fail to see the difficulty with
224 Cannon, 267 U.S. at 336.
225 See supra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing plaintiffs legal argu-
ments).
226 Cannon, 267 U.S. at 336-37.
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483, 496
(D. Kan. 1978) (discussing the decreasing role of Cannon in a determination of per-
sonal jurisdiction since Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and the
prevalence of long-arm statutes); Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 31, at 3 ("[In the
Cannon opinion,] Brandeis seemed to deny that any constitutional questions were pre-
sented and to suggest that the problem was that no state law or congressional act
authorized jurisdiction.").
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the plaintiff's veil-piercing argument in support of service. If we are
clear about both aspects of the problem with service on the parent
in Cannon, then the Court's purported endorsement of the model of
vicarious jurisdiction is readily exposed as inaccurate. Service was in-
effective in Cannon, not because the plaintiff made an insufficient
showing that the separate corporate identities of Cudahy and its sub-
sidiary should be ignored, but because such a showing could never be
sufficient to justify the exercise of jurisdiction when neither the state
nor federal legislature had attempted to stretch the territorial reach of
the court that far. In its regard for the principle of legislative primacy,
then, Brandeis's opinion in Cannon is entirely consistent with the pre-
sumption he endorsed thirteen years later in Erie. As Purcell has
noted, Brandeis's constitutional theory in Erie "was grounded on two
related principles":
The first... was that legislative and judicial powers were coextensive.
The second ... was that federal judicial power was also limited to those
areas-not involving constitutional fights-where Congress had chosen
to act. Absent compelling reason, the federal courts should not make
law even in areas within the national legislative power unless and until
Congress made the initial decision to assert national authority in that
area.
If it is recognized that Brandeis acted with a similar fidelity to the
legislative prerogative in mind, then we are again reminded that-
contrary to conventional wisdom-the Court in Cannon did not
approve using a general federal common law of veil piercing for
jurisdictional purposes. To believe that it did requires buying into two
other assumptions. First, one must accept that, despite his profound
opposition to the rule in Swift, Brandeis endorsed adoption of an
ambiguous federal common law rule in the Cannon case that allowed
the judiciary to disregard the corporate form for jurisdictional
purposes without legislative authorization to do so. The conventional
view also requires a second leap of faith: namely, that we accept, with
an uncharacteristic level of consensus and without any meaningful
discussion or debate among the justices, that the Court adopted a
wholly new and expansive view ofjurisdiction. Rather than eliding the
considerable evidence to the contrary, the more persuasive view is that
the conventional wisdom about Cannon is wrong.
229 PURCELL, supra note 34, at 172.
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III. BUILDING THE CASE AGAINST VICARIOUSJURISDICTION
I have argued that a careful marshalling of the available historical
evidence suggests that the traditional view of Cannon is mistaken. The
Court did not approve the use of veil piercing in measuring a
defendant's amenability to jurisdiction. In this final Part, I put the
question of the proper meaning of Cannon to one side and focus, in-
stead, on building a case against jurisdictional veil piercing independ-
ent of the precedential legitimacy of Cannon. Having already dis-
pensed with the notion that the substantive law of veil piercing has any
proper role to play in the first two steps of the jurisdictional test-as to
notice and statutory amenability to suit-the focus of this final Part
concerns the use of veil-piercing doctrine to measure the constitu-
tional limits ofjudicial jurisdiction. 23 0 The argument against using the
substantive law of veil piercing for jurisdictional purposes proceeds in
two parts. I argue, first, that there are real, practical difficulties with
relying on the substantive law of veil piercing as a jurisdictional meas-
ure; second, I offer a normative claim that questions the legitimacy of
invoking veil piercing as a measure of the limits of judicial jurisdic-
tion.
A. The Pragmatic Case Against Jurisdictional Veil Piercing
For almost as long as there has been a doctrine, veil piercing has
been the subject of searing criticism. 21  It has been derisively called
many things: "unprincipled, 3 2 "defy[ing] any attempt at rational
explanation, 3 3 "not entirely comprehensible, 2 4 "dysfunctional,"23'
and "freakish[] .236 Whittled down to their essential core, the critiques
ofjurists and corporate law scholars may be described as two-fold: veil
230 See discussion supra Part I (describing the three-part process for determining
the scope of a court's jurisdiction).
231 Then a judge on the New York Court of Appeals, Benjamin Cardozo derided
the doctrine in 1926-only a little more than a decade after Maurice Wormser's first
work on the subject, and, notably, a year after Brandeis's decision in Cannon-as "en-
veloped in the mists of metaphor." Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y.
1926).
232 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89,89 (1985).
233Jonathan M. Landers, A Unifed Approach to Parent, Subsidiary and Affiliate Ques-
tions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 589, 620 (1975).
234 BLUMBERG, supra note 19, at 8.
235 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26J. CORP. L. 479, 506 (2001).
26 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 232, at 89.
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piercing is indeterminate and, worse still, irrelevant to the harm caused
to the victims the doctrine was ostensibly designed to protect.
1. The Indeterminacy of Corporate Disregard Doctrine
Formulations of the veil-piercing test vary by jurisdiction. Some
are based on statute, others on common law; some versions of the test
are based on broad standards of equity (e.g., Was the corporation the
controlling shareholder's "alter ego"?2 37 Did the shareholder exercise
"undue domination" and "control" of the corporate form?2 38 Was
there "unjust enrichment"?239 Would avoidance of personal liability
"sanction a fraud or promote injustice"?240 and so forth), while others
recite a laundry list of factors that, at times, can be quite exhaustive
and usually contain all sorts of freewheeling inquiries (e.g., Did the
shareholder use the corporation "as a mere shell, instrumentality or
conduit"241 for another business? Was there a "failure to maintain
minutes or adequate corporate records"?2 42 Was there a "disregard of
legal formalities"?243 Did two related entities use the "same office
or business location"?244 and on and on). What these wildly divergent
rules share is a seemingly unavoidable penchant for indeterminacy.
As Stephen Bainbridge has observed, veil-piercing cases "are highly
fact-specific. Successful veil-piercing claims differ only in degree,
but not in kind, from unsuccessful claims. 245 The result of all of
this indeterminacy in the standards for piercing, among and within
237 See, e.g., Minifie v. Rowley, 202 P. 673, 676 (Cal. 1922) (piercing corporate veil
because the corporation was the "alter ego" of its controlling shareholder).
238 See, e.g., Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 569 (7th Cir.
1985) (affirming that the domination by one individual of two corporations and such
individual's operation of both corporations "very loosely as suited his convenience"
warranted piercing the corporate veil). See generally Thompson, supra note 20, at 1063
(finding instrumentality-defined as a situation where a corporation is no more than a
tool or instrument of its shareholders-and "alter ego" as commonly cited reasons for
piercing the corporate veil).
23 See, e.g., Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 993 F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir.
1993) (citing "unjust enrichment" as one basis for piercing corporate veil).
240 Minifie, 202 P. at 676. ("Before the acts and obligations of a corporation can be
legally recognized as those of a particular person, and vice versa.., the facts [must be]
such that an adherence to the fiction of the separate existence of the corporation
would... sanction a fraud or promote injustice.").
241 Assoc. Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 815 (Cal. Ct. App.
1962).
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 506-07.
AGAINST VICARJOUSJURISDICTION
jurisdictions, is that the precedents applying the doctrine become no
precedents at all. Business planners are left unable to give guidance
on how a business and its owners may avoid liability. Litigants and
courts are forced to struggle on their own with the law's scattershot
approach to defining when the corporate shield may be disregarded.
2. The Irrelevance of Veil Piercing
The second, damning critique of veil piercing leveled by jurists
and corporate law scholars is that the factors invoked to justify its ap-
plication are wholly irrelevant to the harm caused to victims. Robert
Thompson has shown that, as an empirical matter, veil-piercing doc-
trine has principally been applied against shareholders in cases involv-
241
ing contract creditors. Yet, as noted by Robert Clark, one of the
leading critics of veil piercing, the standards by which agency and in-
strumentality theories (versions of veil-piercing doctrine in many ju-
risdictions) are measured "are, upon analysis, singularly lacking in di-
rect relevance to the question of the existence, and the amount, of
harm caused the outside creditor by the misbehavior of the control-
ling shareholder. 2 47 Clark has argued that fraudulent transfer law is
248
better suited for remedying wrongs suffered by contract creditors.
By contrast, the relevance of veil piercing to the rationales behind
extending tort liability to involuntary victims of corporate wrongdoing
is even more attenuated. As Douglas Michael recently observed:
[B]y definition, there can be no misrepresentation to, or reliance by,
involuntary plaintiffs. Therefore, any discussion of fraud, or even of
undercapitalization couched in reliance or expectation terms, does
nothing to advance the analysis here. Courts' attempts to deal with this
problem by means of the instrumentality or "alter ego" doctrine ... have
been disappointing primarily because the courts look at factors wholly
irrelevant to the cause of the plaintiffs injury."'
What, for instance, does the fact that a subsidiary corporation
failed to maintain minutes or disregarded legal formalities have to
246 See Thompson, supra note 20, at 1058 (recognizing that such findings go
against the "conventional wisdom" that tort claimants are more successful at piercing
the corporate veil).
247 Robert C. Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REv.
505, 553 (1977).
248 See id. at 560-611 ("The law of fraudulent conveyances, together with the law of
voidable preferences, implicates a coherent set of conceptually distinct moral princi-
ples that should govern the conduct of debtors toward their creditors.").249
Douglas C. Michael, To Know a Veil, 26 J. CoRP. L. 41, 49 (2000) (footnote
omitted).
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do with the negligence that causes injury to a tort victim? Yet,
Thompson's empirical study reveals that when it is found that a de-
fendant has failed to follow legal formalities the courts pierce nearly
sixty-seven percent of the time.2 50 The one relevant factor commonly
appearing on veil-piercing lists is the issue of undercapitalization, or
the siphoning off of corporate funds. What any victim (tort and con-
tract creditors alike) really cares about, of course, is not whether the
corporation followed corporate formalities or the like, but whether
there is money to cover their losses. Failure to adequately capitalize a
corporation, therefore, gets much closer to the actual cause of the
harm. It is also clear, however, that courts typically do not regard un-
dercapitalization as a dispositive factor in deciding whether to impose
personal liability on shareholders.25'
3. Applying the Critiques of Substantive Veil Piercing to the
Jurisdictional Realm
If veil piercing as a matter of substantive law is unpredictable and
unprincipled, it is equally so when applied in the jurisdictional con-
text. In measuring the limits ofjudicial power, the use of veil piercing
carries significant practical costs both before and after litigation en-
sues. Lawyers have difficulty adequately counseling their clients ex
ante to avoid individual liability; ex post, litigation becomes costlier
and more unwieldy. While it is difficult to quantify how much desir-
able prelitigation behavior is deterred (and, correspondingly, how
much undesirable behavior is made necessary) by maintaining an
unprincipled doctrine, it is possible to get some sense of the litigation
costs that are sustained. As compared with directjurisdictional inquir-
ies, indirect jurisdictional examinations tend to be both more
complicated and less determinate. Dunn v. A/S Em. Z. Svitzer is a
good example of these difficulties. It also shows how even the most
carefuljurists can be led astray by vicarious jurisdiction assertions.
At first blush, Dunn presents itself as a rather complex case. Four-
teen separately named defendants, five different sets of legal counsel,
2 53and an injury-inducing accident that occurred overseas. Of the
fourteen named defendants, only two had any contacts with Texas,
and none of these contacts were related to the claims being asserted
250 Thompson, supra note 20, at 1063 tbl.1 1.
251 Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 520-21.
252 885 F. Supp. 980 (S.D. Tex. 1995). Dunn involves workers injured while work-
ing abroad who brought civil actions against several foreign companies. Id. at 980.
253 Id. at 982-83.
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in the case.2 ' 4  The plaintiffs premised the exercise of the federal
court's general jurisdiction over the remaining twelve defendants on a
vicarious jurisdiction argument or, more precisely, on several vicarious
jurisdiction arguments. To demonstrate the court's power over some
of the defendants, the plaintiffs layered two vicarious jurisdiction
claims on top of one another; for others, amenability depended on
the layering of three vicarious jurisdiction claims. The chart below
gives some sense of the jurisdictional complexity that the court was
forced to confront.
Kiewit Corporate Structure
..... Kiewit Construction
Kiewit Constructioa, - Company MT Group (JV)
Grou .(One Texas Contact) .IV. partners listed below(No TexpaC6ntacts) e { (No Texas Contacts)Group... ) L Kiewit A/S
-... .ewit Diversified Group (No Texas Contacts) D&W
A (No Texas Contacts) ..V (No Texas Contacts)
Peter Kiewit
& Sons Kiewit Tunneling Group 3 (VJ)/' Campenon
(No Texas .. (No Texas Contacts) (Noexas Contacts)
Contacts)
........
PKS thformation Systems ,, SOGEA
(No Texas . (No Texas Contacts)
Kiewit Mining Group . 2 (VJ) MT A/S
(Insufficient Texas Contacts) ............. (No Texas Contacts)
MFS Network ..... Kiewit A/S
("Cont. & Sys." Texas Contacts) (No Texas Contacts)
The 1 (VJ) line reflects the first vicarious jurisdiction argument the
plaintiffs advanced. According to this argument, the court should in-
voke veil-piercing law to disregard the separate entity status of the two
subsidiaries with Texas contacts and attribute their forum nexus to
the parent company. Assuming the Texas contacts of two of its sub-
sidiaries could be attributed up to the parent, the plaintiffs next ar-
gued in 2(VJ) that the corporate veil between Kiewit A/S and the par-
ent should be pierced. This would then allow the court to attribute
down to this separate subsidiary-who otherwise had no connection
to the state-Texas contacts that had been vicariously ascribed to the
parent. Finally, assuming these two piercing claims were permitted,
the plaintiffs argued in 3(VJ) that it was appropriate to attribute the
254 Id. at 989-90.
255 Id. at 983-90.
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twice-removed vicarious Texas contacts ascribed to Kiewit A/S to the
joint venture and its other four members.256
That Judge Lee Rosenthal chose to analyze these arguments rig-
orously, consistent with the prevailing law of the Circuit, is testimony
to the dedication of one thoughtful jurist. It is also, however, reflec-
tive of the distorting excesses to which the prevailing model of vicari-
ous jurisdiction may be taken. If the vicarious jurisdiction arguments
presented in Dunn had been rejected out of hand, the jurisdictional
question would have been more readily resolved. Indeed, one may
surmise that no lawsuit would have been filed in Texas in the first
place because there was no evidence of any direct involvement in the
forum by twelve of the fourteen defendants. The problem that Dunn
typifies has little to do with the court's conclusion: At the end of the
day, all defendants were dismissed, save for the one joint venture
member with sufficient contacts in Texas of its own to satisfy the gen-
257
eral jurisdiction threshold. Rather, the problem is that the court felt
obliged to examine all of the business relationships between the de-
fendants, in light of the governing controlling authorities in the cir-
cuit, that approve consideration of vicarious jurisdictional inquiries.
If Dunn is an illustration of the excesses to which vicarious juris-
dictional theory may lead, it is not an outlier. Indirect jurisdiction
cases routinely require heavier labor in gathering, examining, and
analyzing facts because of the ambiguous nature of the veil-piercing
law on which the jurisdictional argument is predicated. As applied in
the jurisdictional context, veil piercing has the practical effect of rais-
ing the litigation costs for all parties through the burdens of added
2581
discovery and other pretrial matters.
It may be suggested, however, that veil piercing does not necessar-
ily produce wrong results in practice. Although the prevailing wisdom
256 Because the chart amply illustrates the complexity of the jurisdictional asser-
Lions advanced, I have intentionally left off additional vicarious jurisdiction arguments
made by the plaintiffs tojustify exercising jurisdiction over the remaining Kiewit sub-
sidiaries. It may be noted, however, that they followed a similar pattern to the layering
argument described above, except that the 3 (vJ) argument was not needed as to these
remaining defendants. See id. at 987-90.
257 Id. at 992.
258 See, e.g., First City, Texas-Houston, N.A. v. Rafidain Bank, 150 F.3d 172, 177 (2d
Cir. 1998) (finding that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow
plaintiff additional discovery before granting defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, where such discovery was relevant to the question of the
degree of control maintained by the central banking authority in Iraq over an affiliated
bank for purposes of assessing the applicability of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act).
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in corporate law circles is that veil piercing is wrongheaded, some
scholars have argued that judges manage nonetheless to reach the
right results. If the judicial hunch6 ° can overcome the doctrinal
limitations of veil piercing, then whether or not use of the veil-
piercing doctrine actually violates the liability predicate principle of
jurisdiction on a theoretical level, there may be little practical conse-
quence in maintaining the prevailing model of vicarious jurisdiction.
Incorporating veil piercing into jurisdiction is problematic, but it
does not necessarily produce wrong outcomes, at least in most specific
jurisdiction cases. 26 1 Furthermore, it is a hollow suggestion that it is
even possible to distinguish "right" jurisdictional outcomes from
"wrong" ones. Surely, what is right to the victor will look decidedly
less right to the vanquished. The pragmatic argument against veil
piercing does not depend, however, on the premise that courts will
always (or even frequently) reach the wrong jurisdictional result. The
assertion that the doctrine should be maintained because judges can
and do overcome the difficulties of veil-piercing law ignores the per-
nicious social and economic consequences that are borne by litigants
and nonlitigants alike from the mere continued existence and poten-
tial application of an ambiguous and unprincipled doctrine. Cass
Sunstein notes that ambiguous rules-especially those that rely on
imprecise, multilayered factors, such as veil piercing-make reliance
upon those rules difficult; as a result, ambiguous rules produce sub-
stantial social costs. 2 62 Otherwise desirable behavior is deterred, while
259 See Thompson, supra note 20, at 1037 (observing that despite repeated criti-
cisms of veil-piercing doctrine, "many believe that beneath this layer of unhelpful lan-
guage courts are getting it right" (citing Adolf A. Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 343, 345 (1947); Elvin R. Latty, The Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal
Problems, 34 MICH. L. REv. 597, 630 (1936)).
260 See Latty, supra note 259, at 634-35 for the posit that, although it is not:
impossible for a court to reach a correct decision, state the result in orthodox
entity language and yet reveal the real reasons for [a] holding... with so con-
venient a verbal formula as the separate-and-distinct-entity concept and its an-
tidote, entity-disregard, judicial opinions are not likely to reveal the real rea-
sons for the decision.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 268-306 (critiquing jurisdictional veil pierc-
ing, but distinguishing specific from general jurisdiction cases).
262 As Cass Sunstein has observed:
In modem regulation, a pervasive problem is that members of regulated
classes face ambiguous and conflicting guidelines, so that they do not know
how to plan. For people who are subject to public force, it becomes especially
important to know what the law is before the actual case arises. Indeed, it may
be more important to know what the law is than to have a law of any particular
kind. Consider, for instance, the Miranda rules. A special virtue of those rules
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wasteful or unwanted behavior is fostered. Moreover, reported deci-
sions are but a small percentage of the total number of lawsuits filed,
and the total number of lawsuits filed is, in turn, only a small percent-
age of the total quantum of behavior affected by prevailing legal
norms. Accordingly, veil piercing factored into a jurisdictional
analysis would have the negative potential to at best confuse and, at
worst, misguide businesses and litigants.
Taken together, all of the added complexity and reduced cer-
tainty attendant to the invocation of veil piecing for jurisdictional
purposes produces significant costs. Those operating at the ground
level-business planners, litigants, and trial courts-most heavily bear
these costs because they must operate within a complex and indeter-
minate body of law. The complexity and indeterminacy of vicarious
jurisdiction precedents may distort the litigation matrix. Such prece-
dent makes the pretrial processes of discovery and of motion practice
overly burdensome, which is likely to increase the in terrorem value of
suits asserting such jurisdictional theories.
In sum, as compared with directjurisdictional analysis, the current
model warrants reconsideration. The model's distorting conse-
quences, which flow from allowing vicarious jurisdictional assertions
to be made, are measured by increased uncertainty before litigation
and by reduced predictability and added expenses after filing. Thus,
even ifjudges in reported cases overcome the limitations of the formal
doctrine, the costs are substantial in maintaining a doctrine as inco-
herent and unpredictable as veil-piercing law.
B. The Normative Case Against Jurisdictional Veil Piercing
1. The CaseforVeil Piercing
To develop the normative case against the use of veil piercing in
measuring the constitutional limits ofjudicial jurisdiction, it is instruc-
tive to first consider the case in support of applying veil piercing in
jurisdictional analysis. By identifying the justifications that underlie
reliance on the use of veil piercing, it is possible to construct a
is that they tell the police specifically what must be done, eliminating the
guessing games that can be so destructive to ex ante planning. So, too, in the
environmental area, where prospectively clear rules, even if strict, are often far
better than the "reasonableness" inquiry characteristic of the common law.
Under a multifactor test, by contrast, neither government officials nor af-
fected citizens may reliably know their obligations in advance.
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 955,976 (1995).
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normative argument against incorporation of the substantive law doc-
trine into the jurisdictional test.
Ultimately, jurisdictional veil-piercing arguments necessarily as-
sume that the reach ofjudicial power can extend beyond the normal
limits absent reliance on a veil-piercing theory. Similarly, substantive
veil-piercing law, by its very terms, allows parties to recover against a
defendant as an equitable alternative to proving personal liability.
There are only three possible applications of veil piercing in the juris-
dictional context, as the following graphs depict.
Direct IndirectD t Indirect Direct
Sirect/Indirec direct
Graph I Graph 2 Graph 3
Graph 1 illustrates that the reach of state court power may be co-
terminous under either a direct or vicarious doctrinal model. So long
as direct and vicarious jurisdictional outcomes are coterminous there
is no need, at least theoretically, to rely on veil piercing to establish
jurisdiction .263
A vicarious jurisdictional theory also could be applied less broadly
than all available direct theories of jurisdiction, as Graph 2 reflects.
One might ask why a plaintiff, under these circumstances, would rely
on a vicarious assertion of jurisdiction. The answer is that we would
usually expect her not to, although one can imagine that, even where
vicarious jurisdiction extends less far than does direct jurisdiction,
there may be reasons that could explain reliance on vicarious the-
264ory. Whatever the reasons why a plaintiff might choose to rely on a
vicarious theory when an available direct exercise of jurisdiction
263 Of course, there may be practical problems. Ambiguities or limitations in the
two tests may provide incentives to choose one jurisdictional basis over another.
264 For instance, the responsible party subject to jurisdiction under a straight-
forward application of direct jurisdictional analysis may be judgment proof. Seeking
a deeper pocket, the plaintiff may assert a claim against a less responsible, or perhaps
nonresponsible, party who might be within the court's reach through application of
some vicarious jurisdictional argument. This has surely been the principal motivation
for invoking veil piercing as a substantive remedy.
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would reach farther, it is the plaintiff's choice to do so. No advocate
for retaining vicarious jurisdiction would argue that such theories
should replace direct assertions of jurisdiction, only that they should
be available as a supplement to existing doctrine. There may be sharp
disagreements in any particular case-or even across the entire field-
as to whether the Court has extended the boundaries of state court
power too far; but a litigant's choice to rely on a theory that would
draw a more restricted jurisdictional line than necessary does not
bear on the question of whether vicarious or direct jurisdictional as-
sertions are more likely to reach fair results in individual cases. By
comparison, legislative bodies are free to truncate judicial jurisdiction
through statutes that limit the exercise ofjurisdiction to less than the
constitutional maximum. Of course, one may be rightly critical of a
decision that misapplies a vicarious jurisdiction analysis to cut short an
otherwise valid exercise of direct jurisdiction under the constitutional
limits the Court has set. The First Circuit's decision in United Electrical,
Radio & Machine Workers v. 163 Pleasant Street Corp."' almost certainly
warrants such a critique.
Thus, we are left with Graph 3-where the use of veil-piercing law
would expand state judicial jurisdiction-as the only occasion in
which vicarious jurisdictional analysis makes a persuasive claim for its
incorporation into the jurisdictional inquiry. Douglas Michael has
observed that substantive doctrines of corporate veil piercing have
long endured despite their incoherence because they are routinely
regarded as a necessary, if imperfect, catch-all mechanism for ensur-
266ing that no wrongdoers go unpunished. Like the substantive law of
veil piercing on which it is predicated, use of veil piercing for
jurisdictional purposes may be understood, then, as predicated on a
belief that in its absence the scope of judicial power would be greatly
circumscribed. The image is clear to the prevailing model's support-
ers: reject the use of jurisdictional veil piercing-long an accepted
weapon in the procedural arsenal-and miscreant tortfeasors, willful
contract breakers, and other bad actors will escape responsibility for
their actions. In short, retaining veil piercing in jurisdictional analysis
is like keeping an ace in the hole.
265 960 F.2d 1080, 1091-97 (1st Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 987 F.2d 39 (1st
Cir. 1993) (finding that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over a Scottish parent
corporation when the plaintiff failed to show that the corporation's veil should be
pierced).
266 See Michael, supra, note 249, at 55 ("Veil-piercing is used, so we are often told,
to reach the right result, or to prevent clever parties (and their lawyers) from subvert-
ing the unstated but true purpose of incorporation.").
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2. The Imperfect Fit Between Veil Piercing and Jurisdictional Theory
Recognizing that the case for jurisdictional veil piercing depends
on its promise that jurisdiction may be made more expansive than it is
under direct jurisdictional theory, we may begin to build the case
against it. The fundamental fallacy inherent in the argument for veil
piercing is that it assumes-without offering a normative justification
for doing so-that the reach of judicial power should be expandable
beyond the limits to which it would otherwise reach absent reliance on
veil-piercing law. While it may be comforting, on one level, to know
that vicarious exercises ofjurisdiction are available to fill gaps in juris-
dictional doctrine, it is the legislature's prerogative to limit judicial
power. Where a legislative body has done so without reference to veil-
piercing standards, incorporation of the doctrine amounts to an end
run around existing statutory limits of judicial jurisdiction. Likewise,
reliance on jurisdictional veil piercing is constitutionally infirm to the
extent that it validates an otherwise excessive exercise of state power
under existing due process limits. Proponents of vicarious jurisdiction
may regard veil piercing as a necessary backstop, an equitable remedy
at the ready. They fail to explain, however, why a court may exercise
jurisdiction under a veil-piercing theory when it would otherwise lack
statutory or constitutional authority to do so.
Proponents fail to offer a cogent and convincing explanation
precisely because none exists. Just as the substantive doctrine is ir-
relevant to the reasons tort or contract law would provide a remedy to
victims of a corporation's wrongdoing, so too is veil piercing equally
irrelevant when it is imported into the jurisdictional equation. The
standards by which we measure whether to pierce the corporate veil
tell us nothing about the various interests that must be balanced in
267the constitutional evaluation of judicial jurisdiction. What does a
failure to follow corporate formalities, for instance, tell us about the
regulatory interests a state may have in allowing suit to be maintained
267 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 .(1945) (holding that for in
personam jurisdiction, a defendant must "have certain minimum contacts with [the
forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice" (quotations omitted)); Burbank, supra note 61, at
118 (discussing the "headquarters basis" ofjurisdiction over a corporation as a balance
between and defendant corporation's expectations and the states' interests in having
"a least one place where a person or corporation can be sued"); Robert Casad,Jurisdic-
tion in Civil Actions at the End of the Twentieth Century: Forum Conveniens and Forum Non
Conveniens, 7 TULANEJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 91, 109 (arguing for a minimum contacts
standard that begins with a finding of some contact with the forum state, then requires
purposeful availment giving rise to the cause of action, and finally balances fairness
interests between those of the forum state and those of the defendant).
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against a nonresident defendant? What possible significance can
there be in a finding that regular shareholder meetings were not con-
ducted to the jurisdictional assessment of the defendant's relationship
to, and interest in, avoiding suit in the forum or of the plaintiffs in-
terest in maintaining suit there? In short, because the facts relevant to
disregarding the corporate form are almost always unconnected with
the harm sustained by the victim or the defendant's relationship with
the forum, analytic treatment of a veil-piercing argument offers us
precious little on which to base a reasoned evaluation of the jurisdic-
tional question.
To be sure, jurisdictional veil piercing is similar to modem juris-
dictional decisions in their inability to cogently articulate the ration-
ales underlying jurisdictional determinations. Yet, the use of veil
piercing in the jurisdictional formula, unlike in jurisdictional cases
generally, takes us farther from any meaningful connection between
the application of substantive law and the sound rationales for exercis-
ing jurisdiction. To help see how far courts have gone in the wrong
direction, it is helpful to consider several examples of jurisdictional
veil-piercing cases, which are divided into two categories: specific and
general jurisdiction. As we will see, the disconnect between jurisdic-
tional veil piercing and any sound articulation ofjurisdictional theory
is especially pronounced in general jurisdiction cases, but problems
may be seen in the specific jurisdiction cases as well.
A. Veil Piercing in SpecificJurisdiction Cases
Specific jurisdiction veil-piercing cases seem to fall into one of two
categories. Many of the specific jurisdiction veil-piercing cases discuss
veil piercing, but are really more narrowly focused on identifying the
conduct of the out-of-state defendant that would demonstrate its con-
trol over the in-state wrongful conduct. On these occasions, when
veil-piercing is really being used in the jurisdictional analysis in
a meaningful way-that is, as a test that considers "control" as a surro-
gate for proof of a defendant's direct involvement in the litigation-
triggering events268 -then the analysis will be necessarily limited to
the specific jurisdiction context. If evidence of "control" over the
events giving rise to the claim exists, then a sufficient predicate for
268 See supra text accompanying notes 196-205 (discussing cases that use the con-
cept of "control" to support an analysis ofjurisdiction).
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demonstrating a prima facie case forjurisdiction will have been made;
if not, the exercise ofjurisdiction should be declined.2 9
Courts should avoid the confusing rhetoric of veil piercing, but in
these circumstances, the doctrine is less likely to produce undesirable
results, at least in particular cases. While the veil-piercing analysis of
many courts turns on the question of control and is properly limited
to a search for proof of a defendant's active involvement in the litiga-
tion-triggering event, on other occasions the use of veil piercing is
much more problematic and lends considerable confusion to the
area. Some specific jurisdiction cases avoid placing any particular im-
portance on the question of control and look, instead, to a wide and
far ranging set of veil-piercing factors in deciding whether to disre-
gard the corporate form. Others, perhaps more perniciously, purport
to focus on control, but, in fact, depart dramatically from cases in the
first category that look at control for more sensible purposes. In cases
in this latter category, the question of control is often applied for a far
less helpful reason: namely, it is used as part of an imprecise doctrinal
litmus test for deciding whether to lift the corporate veil.
In the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hargrave, for instance, the court
recognized that undue control could serve as an exception to Can-
non's otherwise rigid formalism, but its focus on control morphed
from a valid consideration of control as evidence of the absent
corporation's direct involvement in the litigation-triggering events to
the question of whether to pierce the corporate veil.2 10 "Problems
arise," as the Hargrave court put it, "in articulating the type and degree
of control necessary to ascribe to a parent the activities of its subsidi-
,,271
ary.
If, on the one hand, attribution may not occur "so long as a par-
ent and subsidiary maintain separate and distinct corporate entities,"
attribution is appropriate when the "degree of control exercised by
the parent [is] greater than that normally associated with common
ownership and directorship."2 72 According to Hargrave, whether the
degree of control is excessive is determined by examining "[a]ll of
the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the operations of
the parent and subsidiary... to determine whether two separate and
269 See, e.g., De Castro v. Sanifill, Inc., 198 F.3d 282, 283 (1st Cir. 1999) (denying
jurisdiction over parent where insufficient evidence of control existed to pierce the
corporate veil); see also supra text accompanying notes 257-61 (arguing that inquiry into
veil-piercing factors can raise litigation costs).
Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159-61 (5th Cir. 1983).
271 Id. at 1159.
272 Id. at 1160.
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distinct corporate entities exist., 273 In Hargrave, the companies shared
no common officers, never had more than one common director,
kept separate financial records, filed separate tax returns, and com-
mingled no assets. 7 4 Following its formulation of the Cannon test, the
court's ultimate conclusion was that T & N and Keasbey & Mattison
"maintained a degree of corporate separation that was more than su-
perficial" 275-thus, attribution of the latter's forum contacts was un-
warranted to support the exercise of jurisdiction over T & N. The
Fifth Circuit's approach in Hargrave remains the law of the Circuit.
276
The First Circuit's decision in De Castro v. Sanifill, Inc. 277 is another
illustration of how control is often evaluated not for the purpose of
measuring a defendant's direct forum nexus, but as merely one step
in the decision whether to veil pierce as part of the due process in-
quiry. Injured in Puerto Rico by a sanitation truck, the plaintiff
brought suit in district court in Puerto Rico against Sanifill, Inc., a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Houston,
Texas. Sanifill argued that its two wholly owned subsidiaries and the
joint venture into which the two subsidiary companies entered to dis-
pose of municipal waste- in San Juan, were the only parties involved
in the conduct giving rise to the plaintiff's injuries. Thus Sanifill
sought dismissal on jurisdictional grounds.27 The central question the
court considered was whether to attribute the forum contacts of the
subsidiaries to their parent, Sanifill, presumably for constitutional
purposes though this was not made clear from the court's analysis. 79
Although the court ultimately refused on the factual record of the
case to extend jurisdiction vicariously, it accepted the possibility that
veil piercing could be used on other facts to support the exercise of
jurisdiction over an absent defendant.
28 0
To attribute the contacts of the Puerto Rican subsidiaries to the
parent, the court observed that it would be necessary for the plaintiff
to produce "'strong and robust' evidence of control by the parent
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 1161.
276 See, e.g., Dickson Marine Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 338-39 (5th Cir.
1999) (applying the Hargrave test).
277 198 F.3d 282 (1st Cir. 1999).
278 Id. at 283.
279 See infra text accompanying notes 284-86 (discussing how the court looked to
control not to determine if jurisdiction was appropriate but rather as a factor to con-
sider in deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil).
280 See Sanifill, 198 F.3d at 285 ("[I]nferring... control from the inactivity of the
subsidiaries might be appropriate under some circumstances .... ").
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company over the subsidiary rendering the latter a 'mere shell.'-' If
by "'strong and robust' evidence of control by the parent" the court
meant evidence that the injury-producing conduct was the result of
actions taken by Sanifill or at its direction, its analysis would have been
relevant and instructive. Yet, even before reaching the question of
control, the court had already dismissed the possibility that Sanifill
2812had any direct involvement in the claim. By control, the court had
something else in mind:
In the present case, while there was no direct evidence of parental in-
volvement, as such, in the day-to-day activities of the two subsidiaries or
in theirjoint venture, the plaintiffs point to convincing evidence that the
subsidiaries lacked assets and were not themselves active following exe-
cution of the waste haulage agreement [with the city] on behalf of the
joint venture."'
Lacking any direct nexus between Sanifill and the forum, the
court had to turn to the vicarious jurisdiction assertion also advanced
in the case. The plaintiff had argued that "the two subsidiaries in
question were so shell-like by virtue of their inactivity as to forfeit rec-
ognition as corporations separate from their parent, whose interests
they serve."28 4 It was only in connection with its attempt to determine
whether to disregard the separate entity status of the two subsidiaries
for jurisdictional purposes that the court's true reason for looking at
control became apparent. The court sought not to demonstrate Sani-
fill's direct involvement in the waste management operations that gave
rise to the suit, but to decide, more abstractly, whether to pierce the
corporate veil between it and its subsidiaries:
In determining whether to disregard the corporate form, courts
normally conduct a highly fact-specific inquiry, including, inter alia,
consideration of the extent to which a subsidiary may have disregarded
corporate formalities; the degree of control exercised by the parent over
the day-to-day operations of the subsidiary; overlap in ownership, offi-
cers, directors, and personnel; and whether the subsidiary was ade-
quately capitalized.285
281 Id. at 283-84 (quoting Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d
902,905 (lst Cir. 1980)).
282 See id. at 283 (observing that "[t]here is no evidence directly establishing that
Sanifill, the parent corporation, owned or operated the truck or controlled the day-to-
day activities of its subsidiaries or of the joint venture").
283 Id. at 284.
284 Id.
285 Id.
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Evidence of control over the day-to-day operations of the subsidi-
ary should rightly be considered a jurisdictionally relevant fact, but in
Sanifill the court used it as only one factor in the familiar laundry list
of reasons to decide whether to pierce the corporate veil for jurisdic-
2816tional purposes. Yet, having already determined that the parent was
not in control of any of the conduct and activities that allegedly
caused the plaintiff's injuries, the court's assessment of "control" for
veil-piercing purposes is difficult to comprehend.
As cases like Hargrave and Sanifil suggest, the question of control
will often be considered as one of many veil-piercing factors, rather
than as a legitimate indicator of a corporate actor's direct involvement
in the litigation-provoking conduct. Yet, when the question is whether
the exercise ofjurisdiction is constitutionally proper, focus on a laun-
dry list of veil-piercing factors simply misses the mark. When veil
piercing is not an inquiry into a defendant's direct involvement in the
underlying dispute, but of a looser, less precise variety from the laun-
dry list of commonly invoked veil-piercing factors, there is no mean-
ingful connection between the application of substantive law and the
sound rationales for exercising jurisdiction.
B. The Use of Veil Piercing in General Jurisdiction Cases
While we have seen that veil piercing can produce problems in
specific jurisdiction cases, veil piercing is more problematic when it is
invoked for general jurisdiction purposes. The general jurisdiction
veil-piercing cases reflect the worst abuses of modem jurisdictional
doctrine.
Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc. illustrates the problem
of veil piercing in the general jurisdiction context. While on vacation
in England, a New York tourist alleged that he fell in a bathtub in the
London Hilton Hotel, owned by Hilton Hotels (U.K.) Ltd., a British
288corporation. Plaintiff sued Hilton (U.K.), its immediate corporate
parent (Hilton Hotels International), and the American parent of the
entire Hilton enterprise (Hilton Hotels Corporation) .289 The latter
two defendants were unquestionably subject to suit in the state forum;
290only Hilton (U.K.) objected to suit therein. It was also undisputed
286 Id. at 284-85.
287 227 N.E.2d 851, 852 (N.Y. 1967).
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 See id. (stating that only the U.K. corporation moved to dismiss for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction).
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that the New York long-arm statute was inapplicable since the plain-
tiff's cause of action did not arise from any business the defendants
transacted in New York.29' Therefore, a New York court could only
exert jurisdiction over Hilton (U.K.) if the English company was "do-
ing business" in the state.292
In a 4-3 opinion, ChiefJudge Stanley Fuld upheld the exercise of
jurisdiction over Hilton (U.K.), z9 though the rationale supporting the
court's conclusion was less than well defined. The "pivotal" basis for
the decision, according to Fuld, was that a New York affiliate, the Hil-
ton Reservation Service, handled reservations on behalf of Hilton
(U.K.): "[T]he Service does all the business which Hilton (U.K.)
could do were it here by its own officials."2 94 Yet, standing alone, this
relationship with the reservation service provides an incomplete ex-
planation for the court's decision. As Judge Fuld acknowledged, cit-
ing Miller v. Surf Properties, Inc.,295 an out-of-state corporation is not
"doing business" in the state if an independent contractor in the fo-
rum merely solicits business on its behalf.296 Miller disallowed the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction of a New York court over a Florida hotel that
297used a New York reservation service to book reservations. Under-
standing how the majority distinguished cases like Miller helps to elu-
cidate more fully the rationale on which jurisdiction was upheld over
Hilton (U.K.) in Frummer.
After identifying the role played by the Hilton Reservation Service
in booking reservations on behalf of Hilton (U.K.), Judge Fuld pro-
ceeded to assert that, unlike the circumstances of Miller where the
New York travel agency was an independent contractor, the Service
and Hilton (U.K.) "are owned in common by the other defendants
[Hilton Hotels Corp. and Hilton International] and the Service is
concededly run on a 'non-profit' basis for the benefit of the London
Hilton and other Hilton hotels., 29 This fact of common ownership
291 Id. at 852-53.
292 Id. at 853.
293 Id. at 854.
294 Id.
295 151 N.E.2d 874 (N.Y. 1958).
296 Frummer, 227 N.E.2d at 854 (citing Miller, 151 N.E.2d at 877).
297 Miller, 151 N.E.2d at 877. In Frummer, Judge Fuld observed that in Miller, "we
held that the activities of a 'travel agency' were not sufficient to give our courts in per-
sonam jurisdiction over a Florida hotel when the agency's services 'amounted to little
more than rendering telephone service and mailing brochures' for the hotel and 30
other independent and unassociated Florida establishments." Frummer, 227 N.E.2d at
854 (citing Miller, 151 N.E.2d at 877).
298 .
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was "significant," the majority further intoned, "because it gives rise to
a valid inference as to the broad scope of the agency [between the
Service and Hilton (U.K.)] in the absence of an express agency
agreement."29
Understood in these terms, Judge Fuld's opinion is patently mis-
leading. While Frummer appears to authorize the exercise of "doing
business" general jurisdiction over one who acts through an agent
when the agent does the business that the foreign defendant would
otherwise perform, in reality the decision authorizes the exercise of
jurisdiction on a different and much broader basis. Without expressly
invoking veil-piercing doctrine, Judge Fuld approves the exercise of
jurisdiction over Hilton (U.K.) merely because it has an ownership re-
lationship with a forum affiliate, a point not lost on the dissenters.3 °0
Indeed, it could hardly be otherwise, since the proffered distinction
between the reservation service arrangement in Miller and the facts in
Frummer was rather thin. To find that Hilton (U.K.) was doing a suffi-
cient quantum of business in the state to trigger the exercise of gen-
eral jurisdiction, the attribution of its forum-based affiliate's activities
to it became essential. At no point, though, did the court try to con-
nect the rationales for allowing jurisdiction on a "doing business" basis
to the particular exercise of "doing business" jurisdiction over Hilton
(U.K.).
It might be said that the theory of general jurisdiction is inher-11 •301
ently problematic. Certainly many efforts have been made, though
with a notable lack of success in finding common ground, to identify
rationales for this form of judicial jurisdiction that most of the world
finds excessive. Still, the exercise of general jurisdiction in veil-
piercing cases is uniquely problematic insofar as there will never be a
regulatory interest to justify the exercise of jurisdiction when its sole
basis is a reliance on veil piercing or some other artifice to merge oth-
erwise separate entities. As Frummer illustrates, exercising jurisdiction
merely because a foreign corporate defendant has an ownership rela-
tionship with a forum affiliate-even where the cause of action does
not arise from any actions taken by the defendant or its affiliate in the
forum-stretches the boundaries of jurisdictional theory beyond any
299 Id.
300 See id. at 855 (Breitel, J., dissenting) ("The occasion for disagreement in this
case is the extension of personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation simply because
of its relationship with subsidiary or affiliated corporations of a parent corporation.").
301 Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business jurisdiction, 2001
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 172 (2001) (observing that "[b]oth the theory and practice of
doing-business jurisdiction are problematic").
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discernable limit. All that stands between Frummer and jurisdictional
infinity is the reasonableness prong of the due process test and, per-
haps, forum non conveniens. Yet, for those who regard segregation of
fairness from the first part of the International Shoe test as doctrinally
bankrupt302 and the forum non conveniens doctrine as impenetrably
vague33 the exercise of general jurisdiction on a veil-piercing basis
hardly appears conditional or self-limiting.
General jurisdiction cases like Frummer and specific jurisdiction
cases like Sanifil illustrate different aspects of the normative problem
with jurisdictional veil piercing. In Sanifil, we may recognize that the
court was careful in its treatment of the jurisdictional inquiry, not let-
ting itself get distracted by a litany of irrelevant veil-piercing factors.
We also may recognize that the court ultimately reached the right re-
sult, rejecting the exercise ofjurisdiction where the facts indicated no
conduct by the parent company sufficient to demonstrate its control
over its forum-based subsidiaries in the injury-producing conduct.
4
Nonetheless, by its treatment of the question, the court also signaled
its approval of the use of veil-piercing principles on other facts.
30 5
Judge Rosenthal's decision in Dunn is another example of a case
where a careful jurist ultimately reached the right result but found
herself forced to examine all of the business relationships between the
302 See Casad, supra note 267, at 107 (noting that "through the years since the In-
ternational Shoe decision, many lawyers, judges and law professors got lax in their dis-
cussions of the 'minimum contact-fundamental fairness' theory" and that "[i]n Justice
Stone's opinion in International Shoe, 'minimum' was not a term that had an independ-
ent meaning, nor was it a qualification of the requirement of contact.... One could
not tell whether the defendant had such contacts as would satisfy the constitutional
minimum until after weighing the competing interests."); see also Linda Silberman, Re-
flections on Burnham v. Superior Court: Toward Presumptive Rules of Jurisdiction and Im-
plications for Choice of Law, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 569, 576-83 (1991) (observing, inter alia,
that "most recent decisions of the Court... have added a most confusing note... in-
dicat[ing] that a 'reasonableness' standard is somehow separate from that of minimum
contacts and must be met independently" and that "[t]his bifurcated analysis is certain
to cause mischief').
303 See, e.g., Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman & Keith A. Rowley, Forum Non Conveniens in
Federal Statutory Cases, 49 EMORY L.J., 1137, 1142 (2000) (critiquing forum non con-
veniens doctrine as overemphasizing private and public convenience factors and un-
deremphasizing choice of law and sovereign interest analysis); Allan R. Stein, Forum
Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 841
(1985) (arguing that the increasing reliance on the doctrine of forum non conveniens
"represents a disintegration of the rule of law and its replacement with informal and
tacit decisionmaking").
304 See supra text accompanying notes 277-86 (describing the First Circuit's refusal
to extend jurisdiction over a parent company that had no control over the alleged
conduct of its subsidiary).
305 Supra note 277 and accompanying text.
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defendants in light of the governing controlling authorities in the cir-
cuit, from Hargrave forward. 306 These authorities seem to allow con-
sideration of a wide and freewheeling variety of veil-piercing factors
forjurisdictional purposes, divorced from any meaningful appraisal of
the defendant's conduct in relation to the litigation and the forum.
Still, for all of their difficulties, specific jurisdiction veil-piercing
cases are less troubling than general jurisdiction cases inasmuch as the
conduct at issue in a specific jurisdiction case, by definition, is more
closely tied to the underlying conduct that gave rise to the plaintiffs
claims. No longer bound to connect a defendant's contacts in the fo-
rum to the injury sustained, the general jurisdiction veil-piercing cases
depart more fully from any sensible assessment of the reasons why the
exercise ofjurisdiction should be sustained or declined.
C. The Alternative to Jurisdictional Veil Piercing: Focus on Direct Contacts
There is a better way. We may start to rethink the prevailing
model of vicarious jurisdiction by turning to recent critiques by corpo-
rate law scholars of the substantive law in their field that question
some of the most basic and accepted assumptions about the law of
corporate disregard. If we borrow from and build upon the founda-
tion these scholars have begun to lay in challenging the accepted wis-
dom regarding veil piercing, it is possible reach a new conception of
modern doctrine's reliance on veil piercing for jurisdictional pur-
poses.
1. Abandoning Veil Piercing as a Matter of Substantive Law
Both Stephen Bainbridge and Douglas Michael have recently (and
independently) argued that we should abolish veil piercing as a
matter of substantive law and, instead, rely on direct theories of liabil-
ity.3 0 7 Bainbridge and Michael both approach the question of veil
piercing by analyzing the doctrine in two separate contexts: contract
and tort. As a contractual matter, where a contract creditor has not
bargained for a personal guarantee, we are reminded that piercing
through the limited liability protections of the corporate form to
306 See supra text accompanying notes 252-57 (detailingJudge Rosenthal's rigorous
analysis of the vicarious jurisdiction claims made for twelve of the fourteen defendants
in the case).
307 Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 516; Michael, supra note 249, at 62. Note that
Bainbridge advocates abolishing veil piercing only as to natural persons; he would
retain veil-piercing concepts for intragroup liability, though he urges recharacteriza-
tion of the doctrine as "enterprise liability." Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 516, 526.
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reach the shareholder rewrites the deal the parties negotiated .3 0 8 If
ABC Corporation did not obtain a personal guarantee from the con-
trolling shareholder of XYZ, Inc., then in the absence of fraud or
other personal misconduct by the shareholder, there is no sound ra-
tionale for giving ABC more than that for which it bargained. Even
without veil piercing, personal liability will still be imposed-and ABC
fully protected-if there is fraud or other personal misconduct by the
shareholder, such as a siphoning off of funds after the contract is
signed or any other act for which existing law imposes personal liabil-
ity. The Model Business Corporation Act indicates the general rule in
section 6.22(b): "Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorpo-
ration, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the
acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally
liable by reason of his own acts or conduct. 3 0 9 As Bainbridge notes:
"This statutory formulation precisely captures limited liability as it
ought to work: shareholders are not vicariously liable for corporate
acts or debts, but shareholders may be held directly liable for their
own misconduct.""1 0 In addition, both Michael and Bainbridge refer-
ence the work of Robert Clark who has argued that fraudulent trans-
fer law and bankruptcy preferences ameliorate the challenges posed
to creditors faced with debtors who engage in ex post siphoning of
funds or secretion of other assets.
Bainbridge and Michael agree that tort cases pose different chal-
lenges than contract cases,1 2 but they diverge in their conclusions.
Michael regards inadequate capitalization as a key aspect of injury for
most veil-piercing tort cases but sees existing veil-piercing doctrine as
inherently inapplicable to involuntary claimants insofar as it is predi-
cated on corporate misrepresentations or reliance by tort victims:
"The initial conceptual stumbling block is that by definition there can
be no misrepresentation to, or reliance by, involuntary plaintiffs.
308 See Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 517 ("Where a contract creditor fails to bar-
gain around the limited liability default rule, there is no justification for giving it a sec-
ond bite at the apple through a veil piercing remedy."); Michael, supra note 249, at 48-
49 (arguing against veil piercing in contract cases on similar grounds).
MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 6.22(b) (1999).
3:0 Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 516.
311 Id. at 521 n.221 (citing ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 39 (1986));
Michael, supra note 249, at 48 n.56 (citing Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corpo-
rate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REv. 505, 540-53 (1977))).
312 See Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 487-506 (analyzing the varied justifications
for limited liability of contract creditors and tort creditors); Michael, supra note 249, at
47 ("[T]he tort-contract distinction is important, because results do and should turn in
many cases on whether the plaintiff dealt voluntarily with the corporation.").
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Therefore, any discussion of fraud, or even of undercapitalization
couched in reliance or expectation terms, does nothing to advance
the analysis here. 313 Michael argues that we should keep the focus on
failure to adequately capitalize, moving away from veil-piercing law by
returning the inquiry more centrally to tort law. 4 He acknowledges
that existing doctrine may need further enhancement to address the
problem of tort victims satisfactorily, and, in particular, he urges rec-
ognition of a more expansive and explicit duty to adequately capital-
ize the corporation:
The advantages of this duty to capitalize theory over the existing alter
ego doctrine are numerous. First, consider the basis of liability. It is not
some manufactured duty to follow corporate formalities, or impart to
the corporation some fictional separate existence. Rather, the basis of
liability would be determined according to questions of tort policy as ap-
plied to the facts at hand. As between this plaintiff and this defendant,
who is better able to bear the loss? Would making the defendant liable
for inadequate capitalization deter formation of "shell" corporations? Is
the defendant better suited to determine the extent of risk and to insure
against it, either individually or through the corporation? These are the
central questions in a tort analysis, but are examined, if at all, only in a
cursory fashion by courts using the veil-piercing doctrine."1 5
Bainbridge, by contrast, is skeptical, and demonstrates that focus-
ing on undercapitalization as the basis for a common law tort claim is
116unworkable. He traces an argument similar to the one Michael ad-
vances to Judge Kenneth Keating's dissent in the famous Walkovszky v.
Carlton 7 case where Keating argued, inter alia, that the court should
impose personal liability on a shareholder if a business is organized
or operates "with capital insufficient to meet liabilities which are cer-
tain to arise in the ordinary course of the corporation's business."3 1
Bainbridge observes that "Keating's proposed rule sounds sensible
enough at first blush, but quickly crumbles once one begins to think
about operationalizing it.... What liabilities are 'certain' to arise in
the ordinary course of her business? And how much capital!
313 Michael, supra note 249, at 49.
314 See id. at 50-51 (discussing the advantages of tort analysis based on failure to
adequately capitalize).
5 Id. at 50 (footnote omitted).
316 See Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 520-21 (underscoring concerns the author
believes "have motivated the courts' well-nigh universal refusal to treat undercapitaliza-
tion, standing alone, as dispositive").
317 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966).
318 Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 520 (quoting Walkovszky, 223 N.E.2d at 14 (Keat-
ing,J., dissenting)).
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insurance is necessary to safeguard against them?"3 1 9 In short, "Keat-
ing's standard thus makes ex ante transaction planning less certain,
while increasing litigation costs by introducing some inherently am-
biguous considerations into the analysis."32 0 By contrast, Bainbridge
121
urges reliance on what he calls "targeted regulation" by legislation.
"If taxi drivers are endangering pedestrians, then regulate taxi com-
panies,"3 2  he argues, squarely placing the responsibility for providing
the legal remedy on the legislative branch where direct common law
claims are unavailable. Bainbridge recognizes that public choice the-
ory suggests that interest groups and institutional biases may make leg-
32,3islative reform slow or unsatisfactory. His rejoinder is that "it is pre-
cisely the availability of veil piercing that lets the legislatures off the
hook" and that "U]udicial abolition of veil piercing thus might well be
a useful (if not necessary) first step towards prompting legislative ac-
t i o n .
'324
2. Proscribing Veil Piercing from Jurisdictional Doctrine
It is not necessary to delve further into the details of the debate
over the differing approaches favored by Michael and Bainbridge for
replacing current reliance on veil piercing to see that their works offer
valuable new insights into the problem of veil piercing that can be
utilized byjurisdictional theory. Just as Michael and Bainbridge argue
persuasively in favor of direct-liability alternatives to reliance on the
substantive law of corporate disregard, modem jurisdictional doctrine
can and should eschew vicarious measures of judicial power for con-
sideration only of the direct contacts between a defendant and the fo-
rum. If a defendant has been involved in committing some act of
mischief in the forum, modern doctrine already permits the exercise
ofjurisdiction by the forum court over her, regardless of whether she
is present in the state or not or whether she personally committed the
mischief or played a role in directing such mischief from behind the325
scenes. In the absence of jurisdictional veil piercing, the only
319 Id. at 520.
320 Id.
321 Id. at 524.
322 Id.
323 See id. at 526 ("[P]ublic choice analysis of the legislative process tells us that
such legislation easily could be held up by affected interest groups.").
324 Id.
325 See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985) ("[P]arties
who 'reach out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obligations
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relevance of a close relationship between otherwise separate persons
or entities in a specific jurisdiction case should be part of the analysis
of whether the defendant's degree of involvement with the underlying
controversy is sufficient to bring it within the statutory and constitu-
tional ambit of judicial authority. Some of the courts addressing veil
piercing in the specific jurisdiction context already have reformulated
the inquiry for cases relying on assertions ofjurisdictional veil piercing
to depend on an assessment of the particular conduct of the nonresi-
dent defendant that evidences its control of any in-state activities
which give rise to the claim.326 These courts have abandoned, in ef-
fect, the imprecise use of veil piercing and replaced it with a more
searching inquiry that keeps the policy purposes of jurisdictional the-
ory in mind.
Of course, this is not to say that the assessment of jurisdiction in
cases involving multiple and related defendants necessarily will be
routine and unproblematic. Some outcomes will be self-evident, while
in other instances, the degree of involvement by an affiliate or owner
(whether natural or corporate) necessary to demonstrate its control of
the litigation-triggering events will often be elusive. On the facts of
the actual Sanifill litigation, for instance, the First Circuit rightly re-
fused to exercise jurisdiction where there was no evidence of the par-
ent's direct involvement in the conduct alleged to have proximately
caused the plaintiffs injuries.3 27 Harder facts make for harder legal
determinations, however, as slightly changing the facts in Sanifill illus-
trates.
Imagine that six months before the plaintiff's injury in Sanifill, the
parent company issued a corporation-wide directive to its subsidiaries
to cut operating costs dramatically. This time, the subsidiaries are left
to determine where to reduce expenses on their own, but the parent
makes plain the severity of the situation. Now the subsidiaries, feeling
the pressure from the parent to reduce expenses, try to save money in
ways that turn out to have safety implications; for instance, they
choose not to properly maintain the waste disposal trucks. The failure
to maintain the trucks properly is what causes the injury that the
plaintiff ultimately sustains.
with citizens of another state' are subject to regulation and sanctions in the other
State." (quoting Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950))).
326 See, e.g., Heritage House Rest., Inc. v. Cont'l Funding Group, Inc., 906 F.2d 276,
283 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that jurisdiction is appropriate in an instance where "a
situation ... is under the control of the nonresident defendant").
327 DeCastro v. Sanifill, Inc., 198 F.3d 282, 283-84 (1st Cir. 1999).
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In this variation of Sanifi1, there is much less direct involvement
by the parent in the conduct that is alleged to have proximately
caused the accident. Consequently, if the parent does not maintain
continuous and systematic contacts with the forum, amenability to suit
under a direct test of jurisdiction will depend on a close evaluation of
whether the absent parent's conduct is sufficient to trigger the policy
justifications for exercising jurisdiction under modern doctrine. Is
the not-so-subtle pressure that the parent is exercising enough to sat-
isfy that threshold?
The problem of identifying jurisdictionally relevant contacts is
suggestive of a similar problem on the liability side: as a matter of
substantive law, the scope of liability as to any particular defendant
will not always be clear, especially at the stage when jurisdiction is to
be decided. We know that hard liability questions will always arise,
and not only because the facts, or the application of those facts to the
law, fall into a gray area. They also arise because more and more fre-
quently efforts are undertaken to intentionally structure behavior to
limit liability. Lynn LoPucki has described this latter phenomenon as
"the death of liability" inasmuch as corporate actors have and will con-
tinue to engage in strategic judgment-proofing behavior.2
The problem of hard liability cases is real, and one may rightfully
regard LoPucki's thesis as troubling insofar as it suggests that involun-
tary tort creditors will bear the costs of this strategic behavior.32 9 Simi-
larly, the problem of determining which facts should be accorded ju-
risdictional significance is equally daunting. Jurisdictional theory
certainly is not immune to the problem of ambiguity, and the difficul-
ties attendant to liability can have profound implications for the a pri-
ori assessment of jurisdictional amenability to suit. It is helpful,
though, to be clear as to what those implications are.
Reasonable minds may differ as to the parent's liability on the
Sanifill variation described above,just as there may be disagreement as
to whether these contacts are sufficient to trigger the exercise ofjuris-
diction by the forum state over the parent for having given such a
general directive. Is the exercise of jurisdiction over the parent ap-
propriate merely for having given a general directive to keep costs
down? The answer depends on how we balance interests. To what ex-
tent does the general directive to cut costs reflect purposeful conduct
328 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1996)
("[C]onstructs can be, and are, manipulated by potential defendants to create judg-
ment-Proof structures.").
Id.
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by the parent in the affairs of its forum-based affiliates? Or, framing
the question slightly differently, is it reasonable for the parent to ex-
pect its subsidiaries to take steps to comply with the directive that
would have the effect of putting other persons in danger? However
framed, any assessment of the parent's interest in avoiding suit in the
forum must then be balanced against the plaintiff's interest in main-
taining suit there and the state's interest in providing a forum for re-
lief. None of the answers to these questions are self-evident, and we
should expect a divergence of opinion as to the right conclusion.
This does not mean, though, that modem jurisdictional theory is in-
capable of being applied in a sensible and (generally) predictable
manner. By contrast, under the prevailing model of vicarious jurisdic-
tion, the parent may find itself subjected to suit in the forum without
any meaningful regard for the policy purposes that animate jurisdic-
tional theory. There is no reason to think that the assessment of con-
trol or any other meaningful inquiry previously conducted under the
jurisdictional veil-piercing rubric would be any more or less demand-
ing if the question ofjurisdictional amenability turned exclusively on a
defendant's direct forum nexus. In this regard, it is important to keep
in mind that the question of control is itself a conclusion and not the
analysis. We should not abandon one form of empty rhetorical argu-
330ment for another.
To be sure, countless occasions will arise in which the question of
a defendant's amenability to suit will be uncertain-where the gray
will dwarf the black and white. This will not change if we reject veil
piercing, but the focus will at least return to assessing amenability to
suit in a manner that keeps the policy purposes of jurisdictional the-
ory closely in mind. We can take encouragement from opinions like
331Judge Franklin Theis's in Energy Reserves, which illustrate that courts
can and do decline to credit weak assertions of vicarious jurisdiction.
Courts are capable of focusing the jurisdictional inquiry exclusively on
the
direct connections among the defendant, the litigation, and the fo-
rum in specific jurisdiction cases and between the defendant and the
forum in general jurisdiction cases. The main difficulty judges face at
330 Cf Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C.
DAvIS L. REv. 531, 557-58 (1995) (agreeing that jurisdictional analysis is confused
when the veil-piercing test is used for vicarious purposes, but arguing that "control" of
the parent by the subsidiary should be relevant for liability, not jurisdictional determi-
nation).
331 See supra note 228 (noting that the exercise of jurisdiction in Cannon was
quashed as a result of statutory problems).
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present is having to decide the boundaries of territorial authority
against an abundant backdrop of prior precedents that approve
measuring jurisdiction vicariously through reliance on veil piercing.
Abandonment of the use of veil piercing may only be the beginning
point in the construction of a more unified jurisdictional theory, but if
it moves us away from the prevailing model of vicarious jurisdiction, it
is a move in the right direction.
Finally, it is necessary to concede that if veil piercing is proscribed
from the constitutional test, direct jurisdictional theory will be asked
to carry the water alone, and there may be occasions when that re-
sponsibility-which it has never borne in the modern era-may be too
great for current doctrine. This is especially likely to be the case when
the conduct at issue is ambiguous or strategic behavior undertaken to
exploit loopholes in substantive liability rules. Put slightly differently,
abandoning the prevailing model of vicarious jurisdiction may make
the blemishes of directjurisdictional theory more apparent. Whatever
blemishes are revealed thereby, the extension of state court power
cannot be justified merely because current doctrinal limits are
deemed unsatisfactory. In transnational products liability cases, this
has been the approach taken in a number of instances when frustra-
tion with the court's truncated "stream of commerce" theory has
made the vicarious jurisdictional alternative more attractive. 3 2 The
proper course is not to seek an end run around existing doctrinal lim-
its on state court power, but to urge, instead, that those limits be re-
thought and modified in future cases to reach a better or more fair
result. This is the essence of what lawyers and courts do and ought to
do under our system of stare decisis.
332 See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1327
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (pointing out that, in relation to present jurisdictional rules, "stuffing
new and complex factual patterns into absolutely rigid legal cubbyholes often results in
distortion of the facts"). In urging an admittedly more freewheeling analysis ofjudicial
jurisdiction than formal doctrine might otherwise suggest (one with "some give" in it),
the court observed the following:
To any layman it would seem absurd that our courts could not obtain jurisdic-
tion over a billion dollar multinational which is exploiting the critical New
York and American markets to keep its home production going at a huge vol-
ume and profit. This perception must have a bearing on our evaluation of
fairness. The law ignores the common sense of a situation at the peril of be-
coming irrelevant as an institution. An apparent growing tendency by the Su-
preme Court to view jurisdictional bases narrowly in the interest of what it
considers to be fairness to defendants is reflected in a few recent cases.
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CONCLUSION
The prevailing common law model of vicarious jurisdiction is
flawed. Contrary to accepted wisdom, the use of veil piercing for ju-
risdictional purposes is not authorized by Justice Brandeis's decision
in Cannon. There is much historical intrigue in the story of the law's
development in this area. The Court's failure to expressly repudiate
Cannon has undoubtedly furthered misconceptions regarding the
propriety of indirectly measuring state court judicial power. Many
courts have found that, following International Shoe, modern jurisdic-
tional doctrine rendered Cannon obsolete; yet even the vast majority
of courts that purport not to follow Cannon still regard the use of veil
piercing for jurisdictional purposes as permissible. Continued accep-
tance of the use of veil piercing has had the effect of enshrining Can-
non as the originating and validating source for invoking the substan-
tive law doctrine in the jurisdictional test. The canon of Cannon thus
remains inviolate, making it and the prevailing model ofjurisdictional
veil piercing hard to dispute seriously, like Don Quixote tilting at
windmills.
Beyond the lack of precedential support for it, the use of veil
piercing is fundamentally ill-conceived as a doctrinal tool for measur-
ing state court power. There are pragmatic problems with applying
veil piercing for jurisdictional purposes that flow directly out of the
twin failings of indeterminacy and irrelevance shared by all veil-
piercing cases. Additionally, a basic difficulty with the use of veil
piercing for jurisdictional purposes is that it depends on the promise
thatjudicial power may be expanded by reliance on the equitable doc-
trine. Yet, just as corporate law scholars critique the law of veil
piercing for being irrelevant to the reasons for imposing substantive
liability, vicarious jurisdiction inquiries are similarly infirm for failing
to tie the justification for expanding judicial power to a normative
theory for doing so. To the extent that justification is sought for vi-
carious jurisdiction on equity grounds as an escape hatch for those
unsatisfied with the current limits on judicial jurisdiction, the exercise
of indirect jurisdiction may run afoul of both the legislative preroga-
tive to limit state court power and the Supreme Court's authority to
mark the due process limits of judicial jurisdiction. Perhaps the rea-
sonableness prong of the constitutional test, or the common law doc-
trine of forum non conveniens, can serve as an adequate safeguard in
many cases. Jurisdictional doctrine, however, generally will continue
to suffer so long as it continues to rely on the present, indefensible
model of vicarious jurisdiction. Finally, while veil piercing remains a
AGAINST VICARIOUSJURISDICTION
valid alternative, the Supreme Court may be less motivated to rethink
the proper limits ofjudicial power.
A century ago, judicial power was severely truncated by the strict
territoriality principles of the day. Jurisdictional authority was coter-
minous with state borders in all but a few instances. Today, Interna-
tional Shoe and its progeny prohibit defendants from evading the juris-
dictional grasp of a court merely by avoiding the forum. The
revolution has not been bloodless, though. Trading certainty for pli-
ancy, the doctrinal rules have become fact-bound and often unpre-
dictable; the borders of jurisdiction are harder to identify. If the
Court has been parsimonious or ambiguous in its articulation of the
limits of territorial jurisdiction under the due process clause, warrant
exists for rethinking existing doctrine. We do not forfeit our right to
critique proper limits of state power by refusing to employ vicarious
theories of jurisdiction that are both unsupported by precedent and
unsound in practice.
Learned Hand once criticized the then-predominant "presence"
test of jurisdiction. Asking whether a corporation is "present" in a fo-
rum was really nothing more than "shorthand" for a detailed inquiry
into the defendant's forum contacts.333 The real inquiry, Hand ob-
served, should
inquire whether the extent and continuity of what it has done in the
state in question makes it reasonable to bring it before one of its
courts.... This does not indeed avoid the uncertainties, for it is as hard
to judge what dealings make it just to subject a foreign corporation to
local suit, as to say when it is "present," but at least it puts the real ques-
tion, and that is something.334
Returning the jurisdictional inquiry to focus exclusively on the di-
rect contacts between a defendant and the forum may not remove all
of the difficulties in modern jurisdictional doctrine, but it at least puts
the real jurisdictional question to be asked; and that, to paraphrase
Hand, would be something.
333 Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc. 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d. Cir. 1930).
334 Id.
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